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INTRODUCTION 
The United States employs a mishmash of enforcers to deter fraud 
in its national securities markets.  Most controversially, it relies upon 
class action lawyers to supplement the Security and Exchange Com-
mission’s (SEC) enforcement of Rule 10b-5, the primary antifraud 
provision in federal securities law.1  Complaints about Rule 10b-5 
“strike suits” led Congress to enact the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),2 which imposed a variety of new bur-
dens on private plaintiffs bringing federal securities claims.  Three 
years later, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),3 in response to charges that class action 
lawyers were avoiding the PSLRA’s intended prohibitions by filing se-
curities fraud claims under state law.  SLUSA precludes most state-law-
 
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (prohibiting, inter alia, the making of “any untrue 
statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”). 
2 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
3 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.).   
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fraud class actions involving securities traded on national exchanges 
and those issued by large mutual fund companies.4  It explicitly pre-
serves, however, the authority of state officials to bring enforcement 
actions.5  Thus, in addition to facing federal fraud liability at the 
hands of both the SEC and class action plaintiffs,6 participants in the 
U.S. national securities markets also face potential fraud liability at the 
hands of fifty state governments.7 
This multienforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence is more 
the product of historical happenstance than coherent design choices.8  
It is therefore worthwhile to step back and ask, from first principles, 
whether this approach makes any sense.  The question is a timely one.  
Stories of the spectacular frauds perpetrated by Bernie Madoff and Al-
len Sandford have led many ordinary Americans to conclude that our 
 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (2006) (proscribing “covered class action[s] 
based upon the statutory or common law of any State” alleging fraud “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a covered security”).  
5 Id. §§ 77p(e), 78bb(f)(4) (permitting “State[s] [to] retain jurisdiction . . . to in-
vestigate and bring enforcement actions”). 
6 The Department of Justice should be added to this list, as should the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority, a self-regulatory organization with authority to pursue 
fraud claims against brokers and brokerage firms. 
7 Nothing akin to the “internal affairs” doctrine in corporate law applies to securi-
ties fraud. The internal affairs doctrine provides that a corporation shall be subject to 
the state laws only of its state of incorporation with respect to “matters peculiar to the 
relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and 
shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting de-
mands.”  Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (5-4 decision).  By contrast, in 
securities fraud litigation modern jurisdictional and choice-of-law principles generally 
allow any state to sue pursuant to its own laws so long as one of its citizens purchased 
the implicated securities.  See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:  Preempting Pri-
vate State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 326 (1998) (“As a prac-
tical matter, because issuers cannot prevent the residents of particular states from buy-
ing their securities on impersonal national exchanges, corporations will have no 
choice but to subject themselves to the laws of all states.”). 
8 For example, the federal securities laws predate the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
the “minimum contacts” test in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 
and therefore were enacted at a time when most state courts had difficulty obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants in securities fraud cases.  See Margaret V. 
Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5:  The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 704 (1990) (noting that Congress enacted securities laws when per-
sonal jurisdiction was still “largely territorial”).  Moreover, when the SEC promulgated 
Rule 10b-5 in 1942, it never intended for the rule to be privately enforced, and the judges 
who later found the rule to imply a private cause of action could not have foreseen the 
development of the modern Rule 10b-5 class action.  For a detailed historical account of 
how the private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 evolved, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming 
Securities Litigation Reform:  Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforce-
ment of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1307-15 (2008).   
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securities fraud deterrence regime is broken, and the financial com-
munity has been complaining loudly in recent years that a “lack of 
coordination and clarity on the ways and means of enforcement” is a 
drag on the competitiveness of our capital markets.9  Perhaps most ur-
gently, the Obama administration is seeking to replicate the multi-
enforcer approach in the realm of consumer financial protection, with 
potentially far-reaching consequences for the economy.10 
This Article critically analyzes the United States’ multienforcer 
approach to securities fraud deterrence.  The analysis reveals that the 
efficacy of the approach is dubious.  Although in theory there are 
conditions under which a multienforcer approach would promote op-
timal deterrence, it is highly uncertain whether those conditions exist 
in the United States.  Unfortunately, additional empirical research, 
though warranted, is unlikely to resolve the issue.  But maintenance of 
the status quo is not the best response to this irreducible uncertainty.  
Rather, this Article suggests that a superior approach would be to con-
solidate the enforcement authority now shared between federal regu-
lators, state regulators, and class action lawyers in a federal agency, 
such as the SEC, and to grant that agency exclusive authority to prose-
cute national securities frauds—while simultaneously enacting re-
forms to align that agency’s enforcement incentives more closely with 
the public interest.  In addition to conferring the benefits of simplici-
ty, a unitary-enforcer approach would allow the United States to cap-
ture important enforcer-based efficiency gains that are unattainable 
under the current regime. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  To understand when a multi-
enforcer approach may serve the cause of optimal deterrence, one must 
first understand the meaning of that goal.  Part I thus provides a primer 
on optimal securities fraud deterrence, explaining how—
notwithstanding its scienter requirement—securities fraud liability can 
produce nontrivial overdeterrence costs.  The task of policymakers is to 
 
9  MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND 
THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 17 (2007), available at http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.    
10 The Obama administration’s blueprint for financial regulatory reform calls 
for granting a new federal agency—the “Consumer Financial Protection Agency”—
broad authority to interpret and enforce federal statutes related to “credit, savings, 
payment, and other consumer financial products and services,” while at the same 
time granting states the right to concurrently enforce these laws and preserving their 
authority to enforce stricter state laws.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM—A NEW FOUNDATION:  REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 
AND REGULATION 14 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/ 
regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
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design a liability regime that minimizes the sum of these costs, other en-
forcement costs, and the social costs of securities fraud. 
Part II explains why focusing on enforcer incentives—as opposed 
to narrowing the scope of the substantive fraud prohibition, lowering 
sanctions, or toughening procedural rules—is a superior way to deal 
with the risk of overdeterrence inherent in securities fraud litigation.  
Unlike those other methods, improving the incentives of the enforcer 
can reduce overdeterrence costs by increasing the accuracy of prosecu-
tions without simultaneously weakening the regime’s ability to deter 
fraud.  Aligning enforcer incentives with society’s interest in achieving 
optimal deterrence confers other important benefits as well:  it in-
creases the potential for regulatory flexibility and minimizes the 
unique risk of overdeterrence that the use of vicarious liability 
presents.  Despite these benefits, enforcer-focused reforms have taken 
a backseat to substance-, sanction-, and procedure-focused reforms in 
the debate over how to improve the U.S. securities fraud deterrence 
regime.  The neglect of enforcer-focused reforms would be under-
standable if it were clear that the securities fraud enforcers we current-
ly employ are as good as it gets.  But no one has rigorously examined 
the optimality of our current mix of enforcers.11 
Part III begins to fill this gap.  It explains that we cannot evaluate 
the efficacy of a multienforcer approach without first making impor-
tant assumptions about regulatory behavior.  If, for example, we be-
lieve that government agents seek to maximize the social welfare of 
the jurisdictions they serve, it would be unwise to use multiple enforc-
ers to deter fraud in our national securities markets.  Using concur-
rent enforcers generally, and private enforcers in particular, would 
lead to fewer of the enforcer-based efficiency gains discussed in Part II 
than would the use of an exclusive, public, federal enforcer—without 
providing any obvious offsetting benefits.  If, instead, we take a more 
skeptical view, we cannot say anything so definite.  In a world with 
 
11 Emerging scholarship suggests that enforcement is a better predictor of a na-
tion’s financial development than the formal “law on the books,” further bolstering the 
case for enforcer-focused reform.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market:  The 
Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 245-55 (2007) (suggesting that enforce-
ment may be a more important variable than substantive doctrinal differences in ex-
plaining the development of countries’ capital markets, and casting doubt on prior 
studies that focused on the latter—most notably, Rafael La Porta et al.’s seminal ar-
ticle, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998)); Howell E. Jackson, Variation in 
the Intensity of Financial Regulation:  Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE 
J. ON REG. 253, 275 (2007) (hypothesizing that it may not be “law, but enforcement 
that matters” to capital market development). 
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imperfect government agents, a multienforcer approach to securities 
fraud deterrence may be efficient, but only if three conditions are met.  
Specifically, it must be the case that:  (1) if a federal enforcer were 
given exclusive enforcement authority, it would systematically err on 
the side of underdeterrence; (2) additional enforcers save more in 
underdeterrence costs than they create in enforcement costs; and (3) 
no alternative reforms designed to align the federal enforcer’s incen-
tives more closely with the public’s interest in optimal deterrence are 
available that would lead to an even greater net savings in social costs.  
The discussion in Part III illustrates that it is far from clear that these 
conditions are currently met in the United States, casting doubt on 
the efficacy of both state and private enforcement.  Significant further 
research is warranted. 
Part IV addresses what should be done in light of this uncertainty.  
It suggests that, rather than privileging the status quo, policymakers 
should consider unifying securities fraud enforcement authority un-
der a single federal regulator, while simultaneously addressing any in-
creased risk of systematic underdeterrence this change would create 
by enacting reforms designed to improve the federal enforcer’s incen-
tives.  State and private enforcers might continue to play a role in se-
curities fraud deterrence following such a change, but a role that is 
subordinate to that of the federal enforcer.  Moving to a unitary-
enforcer approach may or may not lead us closer to optimal deter-
rence—we cannot know based on existing evidence.  But such a move 
would allow us to potentially capture the enforcer-based efficiency 
gains described in Part II.  It would also simplify the U.S. securities 
fraud deterrence regime, making it easier to evaluate and improve its 
effectiveness going forward. 
I.  OPTIMAL SECURITIES FRAUD DETERRENCE:  A PRIMER 
This Article assumes that the goal of securities fraud liability is de-
terrence.  To be justified, a deterrence-focused securities fraud liabili-
ty regime must save more in social costs from fraud than it creates in 
enforcement costs.  To be optimal, the regime must minimize the sum 
of these costs. 12  Section I.A briefly surveys the social costs of securities 
 
12 To be truly optimal, the liability regime must also minimize social costs relative to 
other possible forms of legal intervention, such as government preclearance of corporate 
communications for accuracy.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW 575-81 (2004) (discussing the determinants of the “optimal structure of legal 
intervention”). 
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fraud and the circumstances that dictate their severity.  Section I.B 
addresses the enforcement costs of a securities fraud deterrence re-
gime, explaining how the regime’s design will influence the magni-
tude of those costs. 
A.  The Social Costs of Securities Fraud 
1.  What Are They? 
Securities fraud, like other failures in the market for information, 
produces deadweight social costs that may justify regulation.  First, 
fraud increases the cost of capital in a variety of ways.  For example, if 
potential investors in primary offerings fear that issuers will defraud 
them, they will predictably discount the price they are willing to pay 
for the securities.  Secondary market fraud also increases the cost of 
capital, though less directly.  As explained more fully below, investors 
trading on secondary securities markets can largely diversify away the 
risk of out-of-pocket losses attributable to corporate misstatements be-
cause the resultant price distortions will at times work to their advan-
tage.  But some secondary market traders will nevertheless expend re-
sources to verify the truthfulness of corporate disclosures, in an 
attempt to win more than they lose from secondary market fraud.  
This response may cause other investors to refrain from trading—or 
to discount what they are willing to pay—out of fear that they will sys-
tematically lose to these more informed traders.  The effect will be an 
increase in bid-ask spreads and a reduction in liquidity, which will in-
crease the transaction costs associated with portfolio adjustments.  An-
ticipating these costs, investors will pay less for new issues. 
Securities fraud can also upset the efficient allocation of resources 
in the economy.  If fraud is rampant, investors may be unable to dis-
tinguish between good and bad firms and may therefore pay too little 
for securities of the former and too much for securities of the latter.  
As a result, “[c]ompanies whose stock is overvalued may raise too 
much equity and overinvest.  On the other hand, companies whose 
stock is undervalued may find it costly or impracticable to obtain suffi-
cient capital from alternative sources, and thus underinvest.”13 
Securities fraud can also have allocative consequences through its 
impact on corporate governance.  Accurate disclosure helps share-
holders and markets monitor management, which in turn “en-
 
13 Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 1010 (1992). 
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hance[s] efficiency by improving corporate decisions relating to which 
proposed new investment projects in the economy are selected for 
implementation and how already existing projects are operated.”14  
Inaccurate disclosures, by contrast, can disguise poor management 
and prevent value-enhancing changes in control. 
An effective securities fraud deterrence regime would reduce all 
of these social costs, which I will refer to as “underdeterrence costs.”  
By successfully deterring fraud, it would bring skittish investors back 
to the capital markets, reduce the “fraud discount” they may otherwise 
be inclined to charge, and generally improve corporate governance.  
Allocative distortions would thereby be minimized, and the cost of 
capital reduced. 
*      *      * 
Notably absent from the catalog of underdeterrence costs laid out 
above are the actual out-of-pocket losses investors may suffer from dis-
crete instances of fraud.  This is because such losses represent a mere 
redistribution of societal wealth, something with which a deterrence 
regime is not directly concerned.15  If readers find this orientation dis-
tasteful, a unique feature of secondary market securities fraud (the 
most controversial target of the U.S. securities fraud deterrence re-
gime16) may provide a degree of comfort.  Such fraud does not typically 
involve a wealth transfer between the fraudster and the victim; instead, 
a nontrading fraudster manipulates the price at which equally blame-
less investors trade.  Thus, “each loser—the buyer or seller disadvan-
taged by the fraud—is balanced by another [innocent] winner:  the 
person on the other side of the trade.”17  Well-diversified investors’ out-
of-pocket gains and losses from secondary market securities fraud 
should therefore roughly net out over time. 
 
14 Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
253 (2009).   
15 A deterrence regime is concerned with distributional effects only insofar as “the 
possibility of an uncompensated wealth transfer may cause certain socially detrimental 
investments and result in other reductions in societal wealth.”  Paul G. Mahoney, Pre-
caution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 630 (1992).   
16 Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 639, 642 (1996) (observing that so-called “fraud-on-the-market” class actions, 
which target secondary market fraud, are “the subject of most of the attention with re-
spect to allegedly abusive litigation”).  
17 Id. at 646 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 634 (1985) (revised and reprinted in FRANK H. EAS-
TERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 334 
(1991))). 
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Admittedly, this netting out will not always be perfect.18  Moreover, 
there are types of securities fraud that present investors with non-
diversifiable risks of loss, such as fraud in primary offerings, fraud by 
money managers, and fraud accompanied by insider trading.  In these 
cases, we cannot so easily dismiss distributional concerns.  But here, 
too, such concerns may be less pressing than they initially appear.  
First, if compensation were unavailable for these frauds, “securities 
would be discounted to reflect deterrence’s failure in a certain per-
centage of cases,” such that their price would be “fair ex ante, even 
though some investors [would] be unlucky and suffer a loss ex post.”19  
Second, lawmakers could use other mechanisms, such as the income 
tax and transfer system, to redistribute wealth to the victims of these 
sorts of frauds if they felt them deserving of compensation.  This way, 
they could address distributional concerns without interfering with 
the design of the deterrence regime.20  Finally, it may best serve deter-
rence to allow investors to sue for compensatory damages, restitution, 
or disgorgement in these cases; if so, members of society with diver-
gent normative commitments might come to what Cass Sunstein has 
dubbed an “incompletely theorized agreement” to permit such suits.21 
2.  What Determines Their Severity? 
How big would the social losses from securities fraud be in the ab-
sence of legal intervention?  As discussed below, the answer will depend 
on both the predisposition of firm agents to commit fraud and the effi-
cacy of the market-based mechanisms that would emerge to combat it. 
 
18 See Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 227-34 
(2007) (explaining that even diversified investors can suffer net losses from secondary 
market fraud); James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
323, 340-42 (2009) (noting the limitations of diversification as a shield against securi-
ties fraud losses). 
19 Fox, supra note 14, at 283. 
20 This is not a fanciful idea.  See Lynnley Browning, Madoff Victims Will Get a Tax 
Break, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at B3 (reporting on the IRS plan to provide tax de-
ductions to victims of Madoff’s financial fraud); see also SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 1-5 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf (explaining that the “Fair Fund” 
provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 permits the SEC to pay penalties recov-
ered in administrative proceedings to defrauded investors). 
21 Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1733, 1735 (1995).  This Article’s brief discussion of the topic is unlikely to satisfy 
those concerned about the distributional consequences of securities fraud, but the 
goal of this Article is to apply, not defend, the deterrence framework.  For a vigorous 
normative defense of the economic approach to social policymaking, see generally 
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
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a.  Likelihood of Fraud 
The likelihood that firm agents will commit fraud depends on nu-
merous context-specific factors.  These include the mores of a nation’s 
business and financial community, which may fluctuate over time, as 
well as the size and structure of a nation’s securities markets.  For ex-
ample, it has been observed that fraud is essentially nonexistent in 
markets in which the same buyers and sellers engage in repetitive 
transactions with one another over lengthy periods of time.22  It follows 
that there is a greater risk of fraud in larger, more impersonal markets. 
The prevailing corporate ownership structure is also highly rele-
vant.  Securities fraud may best be understood as a species of agency 
costs.23  In other words, corporate agents may commit fraud not to 
benefit existing shareholders, but rather to enrich themselves; an in-
flated stock price can, after all, disguise managers’ poor perfor-
mance and enhance the value of their stock-based compensation.  If 
this view is correct, securities fraud should be less of a problem in 
countries with concentrated ownership structures.  It should also be 
less of a problem the more successfully other corporate governance 
arrangements work to control agency costs.24 
Donald Langevoort has offered an explanation for why officers 
commit fraud that rivals the agency cost theory.  To simplify some-
what, he argues that information-flow problems in large organizations 
combine with “corporate cultural biases” (particularly overoptimism 
and confirmation biases) to skew the information that reaches officers 
and to cause them to disseminate false information to the market-
place—first innocently and later intentionally—in what he describes 
as an “optimism-commitment whipsaw effect.”25  If his theory is cor-
 
22 GORDON TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 228 (1971). 
23 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Se-
curities Markets:  Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 694 (“Fraud on the Mar-
ket is a product of agency costs between owners and managers in circumstances where 
the managers fear themselves to be in their last period of employment.”).  
24 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 11, at 296 (hypothesizing that securities enforcement 
in the United Kingdom may be less rigorous than in the United States in part because 
the corporate governance regimes prevailing in the United Kingdom permit share-
holders to protect themselves more effectively); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:  Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 
905 (2003) (arguing that U.S. federal securities fraud litigation works “to fill the hole 
in Delaware law brought about by the lack of liability for, and concomitant inability to 
sustain, suits for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care”).   
25 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 108, 
167 (1997). 
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rect, the prevailing organizational culture and structure of firms may 
also inform the likely occurrence of fraud. 
b.  Market-Based Solutions 
Another critically important factor bearing on the magnitude of 
the social costs of securities fraud is the efficiency of the market-based 
mechanisms that would emerge to prevent such fraud.  In a world 
without a legal prohibition against securities fraud, high-value firms 
might try to reduce the risk premium investors would otherwise charge 
by taking steps to certify their disclosures.  They could do this in a va-
riety of ways, including by hiring reputational intermediaries (or “gate-
keepers”) to vouch for their honesty.26 
More formalized mechanisms might also arise through private ar-
rangement.  For example, securities exchanges might impose and en-
force antifraud rules on listed firms, thereby allowing those firms to sig-
nal their quality to investors.  Though a securities fraud deterrence 
regime would diminish the need for these private efforts, themselves a 
source of social costs, its value will depend on how much more effic-
iently—if at all—the regime operates to reduce underdeterrence costs. 
B.  The Social Costs of Enforcement 
1.  What Are They? 
That securities fraud produces social costs is not itself a sufficient 
rationale for government intervention.  There is always a risk that the 
cure will be worse than the disease.  Legal prohibitions against fraud 
create their own batch of social costs, which will be referred to collec-
 
26 John Coffee has defined gatekeepers as possessing two key characteristics:   
First, the gatekeeper is a person who has significant reputational capital, ac-
quired over many years and many clients, which it pledges to assure the accu-
racy of statements or representations that it either makes or verifies.  Second, 
the gatekeeper receives a far smaller benefit or payoff for its role, as an agent, 
in approving, certifying, or verifying information than does the principal from 
the transaction that the gatekeeper facilitates or enables.   
John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:  The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Re-
forms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2004).  These features make it unlikely (though certain-
ly not foolproof, see generally id.) that a gatekeeper would knowingly participate in its 
client’s fraud, thus providing investors with some assurance of the credibility of the 
client’s disclosures.  “Legal scholars long have recognized that investment banking, ac-
counting, and law firms can act as private gatekeepers to financial markets.”  Frank 
Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?:  A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 
WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 491 (2001).  
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tively as “enforcement costs.”  Direct enforcement costs include the re-
sources consumed in detecting, prosecuting, defending, and adjudi-
cating securities fraud cases.  Enforcement costs may also manifest  
indirectly in the form of overdeterrence.  The overdeterrence risk pre-
sented by securities fraud liability is sometimes ignored in the  
literature because it is assumed that fraud’s traditional scienter re-
quirement ensures that regulated parties can costlessly avoid liability.27  
But overdeterrence remains a concern to the extent that regulated 
parties fear inaccurate prosecution and legal error.  Moreover, as ex-
plained later, overdeterrence is a risk even in the absence of such fear 
if firms are held vicariously liable for the fraud of their agents. 
As detailed below, overdeterrence produces some of the very same 
social costs as securities fraud itself:  it can increase the cost of capital 
(e.g., if fear of liability causes companies to overinvest in precautio-
nary measures or causes financial intermediaries to charge more for 
their services) and upset the allocative efficiency of the economy (e.g., 
if fear of liability causes companies to reduce disclosure of truthful in-
formation or, conversely, to disclose too much trivial information, 
thereby impeding share-price accuracy).  These costs might easily 
dwarf direct enforcement costs.  The latter are incurred only if an ac-
tual investigation is launched and affect only the targeted members of 
the regulated population.  By contrast, all regulated parties may po-
tentially produce overdeterrence costs.  Lawmakers should therefore 
pay close attention to these costs lest the securities fraud deterrence 
regime ends up doing more harm to the economy than good. 
2.  What Determines Their Severity? 
The magnitude of the overdeterrence costs that a securities fraud 
liability regime produces will depend on lawmakers’ design choices re-
garding:  (1) the scope of the substantive fraud prohibition; (2) the 
threatened sanctions; (3) the procedural rules governing investigation 
and adjudication of claims; and (4) the enforcer.  The first three are 
discussed below.  As will become apparent, choices along these dimen-
sions involve an inescapable tradeoff between over- and under-
deterrence costs.  The role of the enforcer in mitigating overdeterrence 
costs warrants special consideration and is addressed in the next Part. 
 
27 See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 23, at 692 n.8 (suggesting that over-
deterrence is not an issue in securities fraud cases due to fraud’s scienter requirement).  
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a.  Substance 
The more ambitious the fraud prohibition, the greater potential 
reduction in underdeterrence costs and the greater potential increase 
in overdeterrence costs.  Imagine, for example, a regime with a narrow 
fraud prohibition, one that imposes liability only on officers who kno-
wingly make false statements of historical fact.  Let us also assume for 
the time being that these agents cannot shift their risk of liability to the 
firm.28  The overdeterrence costs this regime would create should be 
minimal because it is relatively easy for law-abiding agents to verify—
and later prove—the accuracy of past facts.  Such a narrow prohibition 
would not, however, deter more subtle forms of fraud. 
For example, it would not deter individuals from attempting to 
mislead the market by releasing falsely optimistic statements about the 
future prospects of a company.  If the prohibition were extended to 
capture these sorts of statements, it might decrease underdeterrence 
costs, but it might also increase enforcement costs—most importantly, 
overdeterrence costs.  This is because, without a crystal ball, one can-
not ensure the “accuracy” of forward-looking statements, and it is al-
ways possible that prosecutors would view mistaken predictions, after 
the fact, as having been made with fraudulent intent. 
The risk of inaccurate prosecution and subsequent legal error is 
particularly acute in cases involving forward-looking statements due to 
“hindsight bias,” or “the tendency of decision makers to attach an ex-
cessively high probability to an event simply because it ended up oc-
curring.”29  “In the context of securities regulation, hindsight [bias] 
can mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad outcome was not 
only predictable, but was actually predicted by managers,” and it “thus 
creates a considerable obstacle to the fundamental task in securities 
regulation of sorting fraud from mistake.”30  It stands to reason that 
the threat of undeserved liability might deter some honest disclosure 
of forward-looking information.  Because the value of a firm is best 
judged by future prospects rather than past performance,31 less disclo-
 
28 This assumption is relaxed in subsection I.B.2.b infra.   
29 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 38 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).  
30 Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 (2004). 
31  See Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projec-
tions, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information:  Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. 
REV. 1114, 1121 (1987) (“‘Persons invest with the future in mind and the market value 
of a security reflects the judgments of investors about the future economic perfor-
mance of the issuer.’”) (quoting Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Per-
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sure of this sort would be particularly problematic from the stand-
point of allocative efficiency. 
To deter more fraud, the prohibition might be extended beyond 
affirmative misstatements to encompass material omissions.  Investors 
must be aware of both positive and negative information about a firm 
to value its shares accurately.  A prohibition on material omissions 
may deter a firm’s agents from selectively disclosing the former while 
omitting the latter, in an attempt to mislead the market.  But again, 
the price of broader liability will be an increased risk of over-
deterrence.  Disclosure is expensive, and a firm’s agents must make 
judgment calls about the volume of information to collect, verify, and 
release.  If those judgments are second-guessed in court, it might 
cause firms’ agents to overdisclose information.32  This would increase 
the expense of corporate compliance and, thus, the cost of raising 
capital.  It might also upset the allocative efficiency of the economy:  a 
flood of trivial information, like a drought of material information, 
can impede share price accuracy.33  Hindsight bias again heightens the 
potential for inaccurate prosecution and legal error in this context—
the fact that omitted information turned out to be important may 
cause the prosecutor and the factfinder to overestimate the likelihood 
that the agent believed it to be material at the time of the omission.34 
Fraud liability might also be extended beyond the culpable indi-
viduals responsible for the misstatements or omissions.  For example, 
it could be vicariously imposed on the firms that employ them.  The 
standard deterrence rationale for vicarious liability is that firms can 
combat misconduct by their agents through a mixture of “executive 
 
formance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972–1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶79,211, at 82,667 (Feb. 2, 1973)).  
32 See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (“[U]ncertainty often allows an actor to reduce the 
probability of punishment . . . by ‘playing it safe’ and modifying his behavior by more 
than the law requires. . . . [This] can give even risk-neutral parties an incentive to 
‘overcomply.’”); Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency:  Toward an Eco-
nomic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 159 (1987) (“[W]hen 
fact-finding is imperfect and the risk of being found liable falls as care increases, the 
defendant may be induced to take too much care.”). 
33 See generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  Information Overload and Its Con-
sequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (evaluating mandatory 
disclosure in securities regulation).  
34 See Jolls et al., supra note 29, at 42 (noting that since the liability “determination 
must be made against the backdrop of knowledge that the issue or problem in fact ma-
terialized, and produced a large drop in the company’s stock price,” a “decision maker 
will likely find it difficult to see how a reasonable ex ante decision maker might have 
thought the prospective issue or problem other than material”).  
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selection, contracting and monitoring strategies.”35  Exposing firms to 
vicarious liability for their agents’ delicts, the theory goes, encourages 
firms to undertake these socially desirable deterrence efforts. 
If sanctions were calibrated to cause firms to internalize precisely 
the social costs of their agents’ frauds, and if there were no fear of le-
gal error in the underlying fraud determination, vicarious liability 
would simply encourage firms to take the socially optimal level of pre-
caution.  Overdeterrence would not be a risk because, if a particular 
precaution were more costly than the fraud it could be expected to 
prevent, firms would not take it but would instead pay the sanction in 
the event of fraud.36 
If, however, one allows for either imperfectly calibrated sanctions 
or legal error—and one must, to say anything useful about the real 
world—vicarious liability becomes a potentially costly expansion of the 
fraud prohibition.  It might encourage firms to take excessive precau-
tions, thus increasing the cost of capital to no good end and potent-
ially upsetting the allocative efficiency of the economy.  Moreover, as 
Jennifer Arlen has observed, absent highly sophisticated and patently 
unrealistic sanction calculations, vicarious liability might actually dis-
courage firms from policing and exposing agent misconduct (as op-
posed to taking measures to prevent it) because by doing so they 
would expose themselves to liability.37  Thus, vicarious liability might 
(counterproductively) increase underdeterrence costs as well. 
Lawmakers might also consider extending the scope of liability so 
that it captures those who do not themselves communicate a false-
hood to the market but rather knowingly aid and abet another’s 
fraud.  As alluded to in subsection I.A.2.b, a variety of financial inter-
mediaries, such as auditors and investment bankers, stand in a posi-
tion to detect and prevent—or advance—securities fraud.  When a de-
sire to preserve reputational capital is insufficient to induce these 
gatekeepers to do the right thing, a threat of legal liability might make 
the difference.  Aiding-and-abetting liability, however, may produce its 
own batch of overdeterrence costs. 
 
35 Langevoort, supra note 16, at 654. 
36 Nor would overdeterrence be a risk if the firm knew with certainty that it could 
costlessly and completely shift its liability back to the offending agent.  But if the firm 
could fully and freely offload its risk in this manner, the specter of liability would not 
affect its behavior and thus would not decrease underdeterrence costs either. 
37 Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994). 
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Hindsight bias might cause prosecutors and factfinders to over-
estimate the likelihood that gatekeepers knew of (or recklessly failed to 
discern) their clients’ frauds.  Realizing this possibility, gatekeepers 
might demand compensation for the risk of misguided prosecution 
and legal error by increasing the prices they charge to all firms, thus 
raising the cost of capital.  Alternatively (or additionally), they might 
act with an excessive degree of caution that, in turn, would dilute the 
informational value of the services they provide, to the detriment of al-
locative efficiency.  It has been observed, for instance, that fear of liti-
gation in the United States has caused auditors to develop “a system of 
narrow, technical [accounting] rules that provide certainty and protec-
tion” from liability,38 but that may not convey information to investors 
as well as a principles-based system of accounting would.  Moreover, as 
Reinier Kraakman has observed, “[i]f outside gatekeepers cannot shift 
their liability risks, . . . they will have a powerful incentive to lobby for 
the overinvestment of firm resources in monitoring for offenses and 
against profitable but risky innocent conduct.  In the extreme, they 
may even withdraw their services entirely from small or risky firms.”39 
Aiding-and-abetting liability might also produce overdeterrence 
costs apart from any risk of legal error if such liability is vicariously 
imposed on gatekeeping firms and sanctions are miscalibrated.  For 
example, vicarious aiding-and-abetting liability might cause gatekeep-
ing firms to spend excessive amounts of money on monitoring their 
agents—costs which will ultimately be charged back to the firms’ 
clients in the form of higher fees, thus raising the cost of capital. 
b.  Sanctions 
Determining the scope of the substantive legal prohibition is but 
one step in constructing a securities fraud deterrence regime.  The 
credible threat of sanctions is the means by which the prohibition in-
fluences behavior.  Sanction setting itself requires a difficult balancing 
of under- and overdeterrence costs. 
How do lawmakers begin to determine the appropriate sanction?  
Law and economics scholarship instructs that an “optimal” sanction 
will cause potential perpetrators to internalize fully the social costs of 
 
38 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS:  THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE 370 (2006). 
39 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 
YALE L.J. 857, 892 (1984).   
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their contemplated behavior.40  This goal requires that the sanction 
reflect the probability of enforcement:  if the externalized social costs 
from the contemplated fraud equal $100 and the sanction is set at that 
price, but there is only a 50% chance of being caught and prosecuted, 
a rational, solvent, risk-neutral potential perpetrator will internalize 
only the expected value of the sanction, $50, in deciding how to act.  
Thus, to cause full internalization of the social costs, the sanction 
must be set at least at $200.  In a world without transaction costs (and 
inhabited solely by homo economicae), this sanction would lead to Kal-
dor-Hicks-efficient outcomes:  the fraud would take place only if the 
benefit to the perpetrator exceeds the fraud’s social costs, such that 
the perpetrator could theoretically compensate society for its loss 
while still retaining some surplus benefit.41 
There is, however, an obvious objection to this approach.  Why 
credit the perpetrator’s utility at all?  There is nothing socially re-
deeming about fraud, so why encourage the potential perpetrator to 
weigh the social costs of fraud against his personal benefit?  A better 
approach would be to set the sanction much higher than $200 to en-
sure that no fraud takes place, whatever the perceived benefit to the 
perpetrator.42  This approach would also relieve the sanction setter of 
the many difficulties it would otherwise face in attempting to craft the 
“optimal” sanction.  These difficulties include quantifying the social 
costs of fraud (which are amorphous), estimating the total level of 
fraud in society (necessary to calculate the probability of enforce-
ment), and controlling the level of enforcement (so that the sanction 
remains appropriately calibrated over time).  It also takes pressure off 
 
40 For the seminal article on optimal sanctions, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Pu-
nishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
41 See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate 
Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 398 (1991) (“[The optimal deterrence] framework en-
sures that fines promote efficient results in which the allocation of resources maximiz-
es societal wealth.”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between 
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 (1979) (analogizing 
optimal sanctions to a Pigouvian tax). 
42 To use terminology coined by Robert Cooter, it would be better to “sanction” 
than to “price” securities fraud.  See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1523, 1523 (1984) (defining a sanction as “a detriment imposed for doing what is 
forbidden, and a price as money extracted for doing what is permitted”).  John Coffee 
explains that a “sanction,” in Cooter’s lexicon, “inherently creates an abrupt, disconti-
nuous jump in the costs the actor must incur when he violates the legal standard.”  
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 226 (1991).  But “this ab-
rupt jump disappears when a pricing system is used because prices are continuous and 
thus bring costs and benefits into balance.”  Id. 
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the less-than-realistic assumptions underlying the formula (e.g., that 
potential perpetrators are perfectly informed rational actors, with 
identical risk preferences, capable of engaging in basic algebra before 
deciding whether to act).  If sanctions are set high enough, all but the 
most recalcitrant will desist from committing securities fraud. 
It is here that overdeterrence costs again rear their ugly heads.  
Any sanction—even one that falls short of causing potential perpetra-
tors to internalize fully the social costs of fraud—risks overdeterring in 
a world with legal error.43  But this risk is clearly amplified by higher 
expected sanctions.  Moreover, a high-expected-sanction approach 
risks overdeterring even in the absence of legal error if vicarious liabil-
ity is a feature of the regime.  Vicarious liability is not designed to de-
ter firms unconditionally in the way that the underlying fraud prohibi-
tion is designed to deter potential fraudsters.  Instead, it is designed to 
prompt firms to invest a socially optimal amount in fraud-prevention 
measures by forcing them to internalize fully the social costs of their 
agents’ frauds.  If firm-level sanctions are set at an amount higher than 
the externalized social costs of fraud (as adjusted to reflect the proba-
bility of nonenforcement), firms will have an incentive to overinvest in 
precautions.  An obvious solution is to lower firm-level sanctions to the 
“optimal” level.  But this approach may not be a practical option, as it 
reintroduces the need to determine the value of all the variables de-
scribed above—variables that will be densely clouded in empirical un-
certainty.  Thus, lawmakers are likely to err on one side or the other.  
Whereas overdeterrence will result if they overestimate the optimal 
sanction, vicarious liability will fail to achieve its full deterrence objec-
tive if instead they underestimate the optimal sanction. 
The bottom line is that lawmakers face a clear tradeoff in setting 
sanctions:  set sanctions high in an effort to deter more fraud, but risk 
increasing overdeterrence costs, or set them low to minimize over-
deterrence costs, but risk increasing the incidence of fraud.  If we as-
sume, as seems reasonable, that those inclined to commit fraud are 
more likely to be risk seeking, whereas those inclined to obey the law 
are more likely to be risk averse, the tradeoff in sanction setting be-
comes even starker.  “[R]isk aversion strengthens the incentive to 
 
43 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (1984) (“Even when the probability of pu-
nishment is less than one, if that probability declines as defendants take more care, 
then defendants may tend to overcomply.  In such a case, increasing the expected fine 
or damage award [to reflect the possibility of nonenforcement] would only increase 
overdeterrence, exacerbating the problem rather than curing it.”).   
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overcomply and risk preference strengthens the incentive to under-
comply.”44  Thus, more severe sanctions are necessary to deter the risk 
seeking than are necessary to deter the risk averse.  But lawmakers 
cannot practically apply different sanctions to these groups.  If they 
opt for more severe sanctions to deal with the risk-seeking “bad ap-
ples,” the solution will have an outsized effect on the incentives of the 
risk-averse “good apples” to overcomply. 
*      *      * 
Thus far we have assumed that agents cannot offload the risk of be-
ing sanctioned onto their firms.  What if they can?  How would this af-
fect the likely level of overdeterrence costs that the securities fraud de-
terrence regime produces?  The first thing to note is that risk shifting 
cannot eliminate the threat of overdeterrence that exists due to the 
possibility of legal error; it can only reduce it.45  Even if a firm relieved 
its officers of all liability risk by granting them indemnification rights or 
purchasing liability insurance on their behalf, the firm (via its board) or 
its insurer would still have incentives to cause officers to overcomply to 
decrease the risk of erroneous liability; and these incentives would grow 
stronger as the expected sanction increased in severity.  Moreover, of-
ficers would retain some residual personal incentives to overcomply, 
given reputational concerns and firm-specific investments.46 
However, as indicated above, risk aversion increases the incentive to 
overcomply.  If, as is generally presumed, shareholders are less risk 
averse than firm agents, overdeterrence should be less severe if firms 
assume their agents’ liability risks.47  But there is a catch:  where the risk 
of legal error is significant, and thus risk shifting is actually warranted, 
firms (or their insurers) may have difficulty distinguishing between 
the justly accused and the falsely accused.  After all, if such distinc-
tions were easy to draw, we would not be worried about legal error in 
 
44 Craswell & Calfee, supra note 32, at 280 n.3. 
45 Risk shifting from agent to firm will not reduce the risk that vicarious liability 
will cause firms to overinvest in precautionary measures or take other socially costly 
actions to avoid liability.  
46 See Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1679, 1688 (1996) (“[I]ndividual agents who are employees within [a] 
corporation have their future very specifically invested there, and are understandably 
quite averse to risking any of the assets of the corporation which employs them.”). 
47 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1228 (1985) (“[S]ince corporations are either risk neutral or if risk averse 
less so than individuals, . . . there is much less danger of causing the shareholders to be 
too careful in hiring, supervising, and terminating directors (and through the board of 
directors, the managing employees).”). 
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the first place.  Firms may, therefore, end up assuming the liabilities 
of both.  If so, it would severely weaken the deterrent effect of sanc-
tions, at least for this category of cases.48  Thus, risk shifting in a sense 
replicates for firms the dilemma lawmakers face in setting sanctions. 
c.  Procedure 
The procedural rules that govern the investigation and adjudication 
of securities fraud claims will also influence the level of under-
deterrence and enforcement costs the regime produces.  Perhaps most 
importantly, they will influence the occurrence of “false positives” and 
“false negatives.”  In the context of securities fraud, “an example of 
a . . . false positive would be a judicial finding that a defendant had 
fraudulently misrepresented something, when in fact no fraud oc-
curred”;49 it is the kind of legal error we have been discussing through-
out this Section.  A false negative, by contrast, “occurs when a court try-
ing to decide whether the defendant has committed fraud mistakenly 
finds there has been no fraud, even though fraud actually occurred.”50 
To mitigate the risk of false positives, and hence overdeterrence,51 
lawmakers might impose high burdens of proof or demanding plead-
ing standards on enforcers.  Toward the same end, they might require 
that bonds be posted for costs, adopt “loser pays” fee-shifting rules, or 
use sanctions to deter marginal suits.  But the tradeoff for adopting 
such rules would be an increased risk of underdeterrence, as merito-
rious cases might be discouraged ex ante and weeded out by proce-
dural obstacles ex post, along with more marginal suits.  Lawmakers 
might instead attempt to mitigate false negatives by, for example, 
adopting low burdens of proof or forgiving pleading standards, in 
which case the tradeoff would be a greater risk of overdeterrence.52 
 
48 See SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 526-28 (discussing when permitting sanction 
insurance is likely to promote social welfare); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vica-
rious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1236-37 (1984) (highlighting the tradeoffs between 
the benefits of risk shifting and the costs of deterrent dilution when agent behavior 
is unobservable).   
49 Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711 (1996). 
50 Id. 
51 False positives can increase underdeterrence costs, as well, by reducing the cost of 
wrongdoing relative to compliance.  See SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 452 (“[T]he incentive 
to obey the law is enhanced by reducing errors that penalize the innocent . . . .”).   
52 Certain procedural innovations may improve accuracy without these sorts of 
tradeoffs—for example, greater rights to appellate review.  See Louis Kaplow, The Value 
of Accuracy in Adjudication:  An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 356 (1994) 
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In choosing the procedural rules that will govern securities fraud 
cases, then, lawmakers face yet another difficult challenge.  Though 
the goal is clear enough—to set rules that minimize net social costs—
figuring out just what that requires presents murky empirical ques-
tions.  And, as should by now be obvious, the design of the other 
components of the securities fraud deterrence regime will dynamically 
inform the answers.  For example, if the regime’s substantive prohibi-
tion is broad or its sanctions high, it may require tougher procedure 
than if the opposite were true.53  The characteristics of the enforcer, 
given special attention next, will also influence the optimal design of a 
securities fraud deterrence regime. 
II.  THE VALUE OF A WELL-INCENTIVIZED ENFORCER 
Bracketing for a moment the special case of vicarious liability, the 
overdeterrence risks discussed above are all traceable to a single source:  
regulated parties’ fear of falsely positive scienter determinations.  Absent such 
fear, the foregoing design choices would be relatively easy to make—
lawmakers clearly should choose a broad substantive fraud prohibition, 
high sanctions, and enforcer-friendly procedural rules, and should pro-
hibit firms from assuming their agents’ securities fraud liability risks.  
These choices would reduce underdeterrence costs without producing 
any overdeterrence costs, given that firm agents could costlessly avoid 
liability simply by declining to engage in (or aid and abet) securities 
fraud.  Lawmakers’ only task in such a world would be ensuring that 
prosecutors are aggressive enough in their enforcement efforts, and 
that the marginal direct enforcement costs produced by the regime do 
not exceed the marginal savings in underdeterrence costs. 
 
(explaining that “better information or better analysis” can reduce the potential for 
false positives and false negatives).   
53 See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule-
making, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 276 (1974) (discussing the reduction of the prosecutor’s 
burden of proof and the increased specificity of the substantive legal rule as alternative 
methods for increasing deterrence and comparing their relative effectiveness); Johns-
ton, supra note 32, at 140 (suggesting that “one way to eliminate over-deterrence is to 
reduce the legal standard or require a more extreme departure for liability” and that 
another way is “to increase the plaintiff’s burden of proof,” while pointing out that in-
creasing penalties could offset the reduced incentives to comply); V.S. Khanna, Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability:  What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1514 (1996) 
(“[T]he possibility of a severe sanction under an uncertain legal standard may chill 
desirable behavior . . . . A higher standard of proof may be useful to mitigate this chill-
ing effect.” (footnote omitted)); Posner, supra note 47, at 1206 (“[I]t may make sense 
to make proof easier but at the same time make the penalty less severe in order to re-
duce avoidance and error costs.”). 
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Unfortunately, the risk of falsely positive scienter determinations 
is significant in securities fraud cases, making overdeterrence an issue 
that lawmakers must confront in designing the liability regime.  This is 
due in part to the reality that scienter cannot be strongly inferred 
from the fact that a defendant made a misstatement or, especially, a 
material omission or erroneous prediction:  such events are common-
place in investor communications.  As Paul Mahoney has observed, in 
other types of intentional tort cases “the fact of the harm is a much 
better indicator of guilty intent.”54  For example, “it is rare that a per-
son punches another or takes another’s property by stealth, without 
really meaning to do so.”55  And the risk of error is particularly high in 
securities fraud cases involving omissions, forward-looking statements, 
and aiding-and-abetting allegations, given the hindsight bias pheno-
menon discussed earlier.  So the relevant design question becomes:  
how should lawmakers address the overdeterrence risk that flows from 
the possibility of legal error in securities fraud cases? 
One way lawmakers could approach the issue is by adopting a nar-
rower fraud prohibition, lower sanctions, or more defendant-friendly 
procedural rules than they would if legal error were not a risk.  To de-
termine whether specific variations of this type are desirable, law-
makers would have to predict whether such changes would lead to a 
net savings in social costs.  Unfortunately, this type of analysis may be 
impossible to do with any degree of confidence.  As illustrated in the 
previous discussion, choices regarding substance, sanctions, and pro-
cedure almost invariably involve a tradeoff between over- and under-
deterrence costs, and it will be hard for lawmakers to know whether 
the choices save more in the former than they produce in the latter.  
The social costs of both fraud and overdeterrence are exceedingly dif-
ficult to observe and measure.  Moreover, lawmakers cannot antic-
ipate the precise impact of specific design choices on the behavior of 
collective entities populated by complex human beings.  Thus, there 
will be a great deal of empirical uncertainty regarding whether such 
variations do more good (by saving enforcement costs) than harm (by 
increasing underdeterrence costs). 
There is an alternative route:  lawmakers could focus instead on 
the incentives of the enforcer.  To be sure, an enforcer who is incenti-
vized to pursue at full throttle every case it believes it might win before 
the factfinder will do nothing to reduce overdeterrence costs.  With 
 
54 Mahoney, supra note 15, at 649. 
55 Id. 
ROSE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:02 PM 
2010] Securities Fraud Deterrence 2195 
that sort of enforcer—whom we might label an “aggressive enforcer”—
lawmakers’ only option is to make (or encourage the courts to make) 
the sorts of adjustments to substance, sanctions, and procedure dis-
cussed above.  But the same is not true if instead the enforcer is incen-
tivized to exercise self-restraint in its enforcement efforts.  This type of 
enforcer would forgo bringing some cases that it might indeed win be-
cause it does not believe the defendants truly acted with scienter or be-
cause it recognizes that significant uncertainty exists on that score.  If 
the enforcer is more accurate in its scienter assessments than the fact-
finder (and there are good reasons to believe that it could be56), such a 
self-restrained enforcer could, through its enforcement decisions, re-
duce the occurrence of false positives and hence the fear of legal error 
that leads to overdeterrence.  Importantly, it could do so without the 
same tradeoff (in the form of increased underdeterrence) that more 
sweeping adjustments to substance, sanctions, and procedure would 
inevitably produce.57  Thus, if lawmakers are concerned about over-
deterrence, they would be well advised to focus their attention first on 
improving, to the extent possible, the incentives of the enforcer to ex-
ercise this sort of laudable self-restraint.  Only once they have ex-
hausted their options in that regard should lawmakers consider what 
adjustments to substance, sanctions, and procedure are necessary in 
light of any overdeterrence risks that remain. 
Of course, in selecting an enforcer, lawmakers should not single-
mindedly focus on reducing the occurrence of false positives.  They 
must also be concerned with the enforcer’s impact on under-
deterrence costs.  If the enforcer is perceived as incompetent at dis-
 
56 For example, an enforcer is likely to develop expertise regarding corporate 
communications, as well as a sensitivity to the workings of hindsight bias, that will rend-
er it better at making scienter assessments than the factfinder, particularly if the fact-
finder is a lay jury or a generalist judge.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, 
Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 558-60, 577-
78 (2002) (discussing the potential for experts to make better decisions than lay people, 
including juries and judges, because they have experience with particular substantive 
questions and an ability to adapt to cognitive limitations that impair decisionmaking). 
57 Relying on discretionary nonenforcement has long been recognized as a poten-
tially superior alternative to rewriting substantive laws to eliminate overinclusion.  See, 
e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 38 (1975) (arguing that, in light of the inability of the legislature to tailor a 
criminal statute perfectly, discretionary nonenforcement is an attractive way to reduce 
the costs of an overinclusive statute without increasing the costs of an underinclusive 
one).  My discussion above suggests that similar advantages may flow from using a self-
restrained enforcer in situations where the law itself is not technically overinclusive 
(and a scienter-based fraud prohibition is not), but rather becomes overinclusive in 
practice due to legal error.  
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covering fraud or as reluctant to pursue meritorious cases, the deter-
rent effect of the regime will be diluted by virtue of a reduction in 
the probability of enforcement.  What lawmakers should want is not 
an enforcer who is careful to avoid inaccurate prosecution at all 
costs, but rather one whose incentives are most closely aligned with 
(or can be forced into closest alignment with) society’s interest in 
achieving optimal deterrence—that is, in minimizing the net social 
costs of fraud and enforcement.  We might label the desired enforcer 
a “well-incentivized enforcer.” 
Selecting a well-incentivized enforcer, as opposed to an aggressive 
enforcer, carries two other important benefits.  First, it would allow for 
a greater degree of regulatory flexibility.  As described above, empirical 
uncertainty may cause lawmakers to miscalculate the social costs of 
fraud and overdeterrence and to misjudge how their design choices will 
affect these costs.  Moreover, the discussion in subsection I.A.2 reveals 
that the magnitude of the social costs of fraud may change over time, as 
corporate ownership and governance structures evolve.  They may also 
fluctuate depending on macroeconomic conditions.  For example, John 
Coffee has argued that in the euphoria of market “bubbles” gatekeepers 
and other market-based mechanisms to combat fraud are rendered less 
effective.58  The upshot of these observations is that a securities fraud 
deterrence regime will need to be adjusted over time, as market condi-
tions change and new information comes to light. 
To be sure, lawmakers could make these adjustments by expanding 
or contracting the scope of the substantive fraud prohibition, raising or 
lowering authorized sanctions, or changing the relevant procedural 
rules.  But the initial design of these components is likely to be sticky.  It 
takes time and political capital to enact such reforms, and it seems 
doubtful that lawmakers would succeed in doing so with the regularity 
and rapidity that an optimal securities fraud deterrence regime likely 
demands.  Relying on the courts to make these adjustments is similarly 
problematic, given the judiciary’s institutional limitations and the slow 
and incremental nature of case-by-case decisionmaking. 
A superior alternative might be for lawmakers to keep substance 
broad, authorized sanctions high, and procedural rules liberal, and 
instead to rely on the enforcer to make adjustments as circumstances 
require.  For example, the enforcer could respond to new information 
regarding the social costs from fraud and overdeterrence in real time 
by ratcheting up or down its enforcement efforts or by changing the 
 
58 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 26, at 323-26. 
ROSE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:02 PM 
2010] Securities Fraud Deterrence 2197 
amount or type of sanctions it pursues.  Similarly, it could alter the 
types of frauds and defendants it prosecutes most aggressively.  The 
enforcer could make these adjustments with a level of nuance that 
lawmakers simply could not replicate were they to attempt to write 
them into law.59  But this type of reliance on prosecutorial discretion is 
palatable only if the enforcer can be trusted to promote optimal de-
terrence—that is, only if the regime uses a well-incentivized enforcer. 
Employing a well-incentivized enforcer would produce yet another 
important benefit:  it would go a long way to alleviate the over-
deterrence risk presented by the special case of vicarious liability.  As 
explained in subsection I.B.2.b, vicarious liability threatens to over-
deter even in the absence of legal error if sanctions are set “too high.”  
By the same token, it threatens to underdeter if sanctions are set “too 
low.”  But getting sanctions “just right” can be incredibly difficult.  
Lawmakers could threaten firms with high authorized sanctions with 
less concern about overdeterrence, however, if the enforcer could be 
expected to exercise its prosecutorial discretion wisely in deciding 
whether to pursue a firm.  Corporate boards would feel less pressure 
to overinvest in precautions, for example, if they trusted that good-
faith efforts to create and maintain cost-effective internal controls 
would dissuade the enforcer from imposing liability on the firm in the 
event that a renegade agent committed fraud.60 
*      *      * 
 
59 The enforcer is also better positioned to make these sorts of adjustments than 
courts.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:  Kalven and Ro-
senfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 606 (2008) (observing that the policy concerns 
underlying discretionary nonenforcement are properly considered “by an administra-
tive agency when setting its enforcement priorities, but they are much more awkward 
for judicial consideration”). 
60 This argument assumes that the enforcer can identify adequate internal con-
trols, notwithstanding lawmakers’ inability to discern the information necessary to craft 
the optimal sanction.  Though these propositions stand in some tension with one 
another, they are not irreconcilable.  The information needed to craft the optimal 
sanction differs somewhat from that needed to determine the cost-effectiveness of in-
ternal controls.  To set optimal sanctions, one must know both the externalized social 
costs of fraud and how firms perceive the probability of enforcement.  But to identify 
whether the internal controls a particular firm adopts are adequate, one must estimate 
only whether the marginal cost of investing more in precautions would have exceeded 
the marginal gain in the form of reduced social harm from fraud.  The latter informa-
tion may be easier to obtain—or, more realistically, approximate—than the former.  Cf. 
Cooter, supra note 42, at 1552 (observing that if it is more expensive to obtain “accu-
rate information about external costs” than it is to obtain “accurate information about 
efficient behavior,” then it is best to enact a standard backed by a “sanction,” rather 
than to adopt a strict liability rule backed by a “price”).  
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It might strike the reader as obvious that the incentives of the en-
forcer are critically important to the design and success of a securities 
fraud deterrence regime.  Nonetheless, the literature critical of the 
United States’ regime tends to take its current mix of enforcers as a 
given, focusing instead on how substance, sanctions, or procedure 
ought to be tweaked to move the regime toward optimality.61  Not sur-
prisingly, the academic debate has a sort of inevitability to it, as scho-
lars with different intuitions about the prevalence of securities fraud 
and overdeterrence take opposite sides on issues that defy empirical 
resolution.  The debate over Rule 10b-5 class actions vividly illustrates 
this point.  Both the courts and Congress responded to concerns about 
overdeterrence costs by progressively narrowing the substantive scope 
of private Rule 10b-5 liability and by toughening procedural rules.62  
 
61  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 8, at 1321-24 (discussing various academic proposals in 
this vein).  There are, however, some exceptions to this trend.  See generally A.C. Prit-
chard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities 
Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999) (arguing for enforcement by the securities ex-
changes); Rose, supra note 8 (proposing enforcer-focused securities litigation reform).  
62 For example, the Supreme Court eliminated aiding-and-abetting liability in Cen-
tral Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, noting that, in the face of uncertain 
liability, securities professionals might refuse to provide services to some companies 
altogether and might increase the prices they charged to others.  511 U.S. 164, 189 
(1994).  Accordingly, the Court concluded that aiding-and-abetting liability might “ex-
act[] costs that . . . disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities 
markets.”  Id. at 188.  The Court recently reinforced that decision in Stoneridge Invest-
ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., observing that a broad interpretation of 
primary liability in private Rule 10b-5 actions might shift securities offerings away from 
domestic capital markets.  552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008).  Courts also developed the “be-
speaks caution” doctrine to shield forward-looking statements accompanied by suffi-
cient cautionary language from liability, and Congress later codified a variant of this 
doctrine in the PSLRA.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) 
(providing a safe harbor for forward-looking statements “accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary statements”).  The justification for this statutory safe harbor is explicitly 
based upon overdeterrence concerns.  The PSLRA’s Senate Report asserts that “[f]ear 
that inaccurate projections will trigger the filing of a securities fraud lawsuit has muz-
zled corporate management”; the safe harbor is thus “intended to enhance market ef-
ficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward-looking information.”  S. REP. 
NO. 104-98, at 16 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695.   
 Well before the PSLRA, courts began applying heightened pleading standards in 
Rule 10b-5 class actions.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) generally requires 
heightened pleading in cases alleging fraud, but it provides that allegations of state of 
mind may be asserted generally.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  Some courts, nonetheless, 
required more particularized scienter allegations in securities fraud cases given the 
uniquely high risk of overdeterrence.  See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discov-
ery Stays:  An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and 
‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 549-51 (1998) (discussing pre-PSLRA case law 
requiring heightened pleading of scienter).  The PSLRA later codified that heightened 
standard, mandating that Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs allege with specificity facts giving rise to 
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These reforms have provoked a firestorm of controversy showing no 
signs of abatement.  Some believe they were ill-advised and have likely 
led to a greater increase in underdeterrence costs than a savings in 
overdeterrence costs, while others think that the reforms have not 
gone far enough and that Rule 10b-5 class actions likely still do more 
harm to the economy than good.63  As James Cox and Randall Thomas 
have observed, very little empirical research exists that might confirm 
or refute these divergent positions, given the inherent difficulty of 
measuring the deterrence value of private suits.64 
What explains the relative lack of attention academics have given 
to potential enforcer-focused reforms?  It may be that reforms chal-
lenging the allocation of enforcement authority are simply viewed as 
political nonstarters.  But this explanation fails to justify the neglect:  
political reality changes over time, sometimes in response to cogent 
academic inquiry.  Another possibility is that many securities law 
scholars believe that the mix of federal, state, and private enforcers 
currently used in the United States is in fact as good as it gets.  If this 
belief exists, however, it lacks foundation:  the optimality of the Unit-
ed States’ multienforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence has 
not been subjected to rigorous examination.  The next Part begins to 
fill this void in the literature.65 
 
a “strong inference” of scienter.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2).  The expressed purpose 
of this provision is to “curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits.”  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 
41 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.  The PSLRA also adjusts proce-
dure in other important ways.  For example, it stays discovery pending decision on a 
motion to dismiss, thus relieving the pressure to settle at least through that stage of 
adjudication.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
63 Compare, e.g., Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law and 
Finance Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 
552 U.S. 148 (No. 06-43) (warning that reversal could “give rise to substantial costs that 
might exceed its questionable deterrent benefits”), with Brief for Professors James D. 
Cox, Jill E. Fisch, Donald C. Langevoort, Richard M. Buxbaum, Melvin A. Eisenberg, and 
Hillary A. Sale as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 
U.S. 148 (No. 06-43) (cautioning that affirmance “could seriously impair the integrity of 
our securities markets”). 
64 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation 
Experience:  A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law 20-21 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-10 & Duke Univ. Law 
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 246, 2009), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1370508.  
65 Empirical studies have suggested that private enforcement is more important 
than public enforcement in promoting financial development.  See Rafael La Porta et 
al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 27-28 (2006) (concluding that public en-
forcement matters little, if at all, to larger stock markets, whereas “extensive disclosure 
requirements and standards of [private] liability” matter significantly).  More recent 
scholarship, though, casts doubt on this conclusion, further highlighting the need to 
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III.  WHEN WILL MULTIPLE ENFORCERS PROMOTE  
OPTIMAL DETERRENCE? 
When, if ever, does it make sense to concurrently employ federal 
agents, state agents, and private parties to deter fraud in the national 
securities markets?  The answer to this question turns on, among 
other things, one’s assumptions about regulatory behavior.  Section 
III.A therefore analyzes the issue under the assumption that public 
officials seek to maximize the social welfare of the jurisdictions they 
serve.  Section III.B then explores how the analysis changes if we 
take a more skeptical view. 
A.  Public Servants as Social Welfare Maximizers 
If public officials seek to promote the social welfare of the jurisdic-
tions they serve, the United States’ current allocation of securities 
fraud enforcement authority is difficult to defend.  As explained be-
low, under this assumption it would be suboptimal to employ private 
enforcers.  Rather, public enforcers would be preferable, and employ-
ing an exclusive public enforcer would be better than employing con-
current public enforcers.  Moreover, the exclusive public enforcer 
would best operate at the federal rather than the state level—at least 
absent the stringent preconditions for effective regulatory competi-
tion between states.  While other considerations, such as relative de-
tection and resource advantages, might justify an enforcement role for 
state agents and private parties, their relationship with the federal 
public enforcer would differ significantly from the relationship that 
exists today between the SEC, state regulators, and the Rule 10b-5 
class action bar. 
1.  Public vs. Private Enforcement 
By definition, a private enforcer is incentived to maximize her pri-
vate welfare, which we can expect to diverge from social welfare in 
significant ways.  The potential enforcer-based efficiencies discussed 
 
rethink fundamentally the proper allocation of securities fraud enforcement authority 
in the United States.  See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement 
of Securities Laws:  Resource-Based Evidence 34 (Harvard Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 0-28, & John M. Olin Ctr. for Law and Bus. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 638, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086 (refuting suggestions that public enforcement is 
unimportant to financial markets by demonstrating that it “correlated significantly with 
key financial outcomes”); see also Coffee, Jr., supra note 11, at 302 (acknowledging that 
recent evidence casts doubt upon the superiority of private enforcement). 
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in Part II will therefore be less likely to materialize if the securities 
fraud deterrence regime is privately enforced than if it is enforced by 
a faithful public agent. 
First, it is reasonable to assume that regulated parties’ fear of in-
accurate prosecution and legal error would be greater under a private-
enforcement regime than under a public-enforcement regime.  Whe-
reas our idealized public enforcer would, for example, be sensitive to 
hindsight bias and weigh the overdeterrence ramifications of prose-
cuting cases involving forward-looking statements and omissions 
against the potential savings in underdeterrence costs, private enforc-
ers could not be expected to exercise such self-restraint.  Instead, they 
could be expected to behave like the “aggressive enforcer” described 
earlier, bringing suit so long as their expected private benefits exceed 
their expected costs, even if liability is questionable.  Moreover, pri-
vate enforcers could be expected to pursue the highest sanctions 
available and to exploit procedure to the fullest extent, so long as it is 
to their personal advantage.  Assuming the bounty for bringing suit is 
substantial enough to make private enforcement worthwhile, the pre-
dictable result would be an increase in overdeterrence costs relative to 
a world with only public enforcement.66  This consequence, in turn, 
would likely cause lawmakers or courts to narrow substance, lower 
sanctions, or toughen procedure in ways that may—or may not—
efficiently mitigate these costs.  Again, the history of Rule 10b-5 class 
action reform starkly illustrates the point.67 
Second, it is reasonable to assume that a securities fraud deter-
rence regime would be less flexible if it used private enforcement than 
if it relied exclusively upon public enforcement.  Private enforcers 
 
66 If the rewards for bringing suit were not substantial enough to make private en-
forcement profitable, underdeterrence costs would increase relative to a world with 
exclusive public enforcement.  Cf. Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to 
Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334 (1982) (asserting that the 
“divergence between the social and the private benefits of suit may result either in a 
tendency toward too little litigation . . . or toward too much litigation”). 
67 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  Notably, most of the limitations that 
have been imposed on private Rule 10b-5 litigants do not constrain the SEC.  For ex-
ample, the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements does not apply to SEC 
enforcement actions, nor do its pleading requirements or discovery stay.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (safe harbor requirement); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(1)–(2) (heightened pleading requirements); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-
4(b)(3)(B) (discovery stay).  Moreover, the SEC retains authority to pursue aiders and 
abettors.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (expressly granting the SEC this authority).  Ostensi-
bly, those who have crafted these reforms believe that the SEC presents fewer over-
deterrence risks relative to private enforcers, such that authority that is intolerable in 
the hands of the latter is not when entrusted to the former. 
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could not be expected to use their discretion to balance concerns for 
underdeterrence and enforcement costs the way our idealized public 
enforcer could.68  Thus, if new information or changed circumstances 
called for an adjustment in enforcement policy, lawmakers would be 
unable to trust private enforcers to make that adjustment.  Instead, 
lawmakers would be constrained to leave it to the courts or to do it 
themselves by reforming substance, sanctions, or procedure directly—
with all the additional transaction costs those reforms entail.  By con-
trast, in a world of public enforcement lawmakers could rely on the 
enforcer to respond in a more adroit fashion. 
That private enforcement precludes reliance on prosecutorial dis-
cretion makes it a particularly costly choice for a regime that imposes 
vicarious liability on firms.  One need not accept the proposition that 
private enforcers are likely to pursue marginal claims to agree that vi-
carious liability is more likely to overdeter in a regime of private en-
forcement than in a regime of public enforcement.  Vicarious liability, 
recall, threatens to overdeter, even in the absence of any fear of legal 
error, if sanctions are set “too high.”  As noted in Part II, an enforcer 
can help reduce this risk of overdeterrence by signaling to firms that 
they will escape liability for their agents’ frauds if they can demon-
strate that they took efficient precautions.  A private enforcer, howev-
er, is unlikely to send such a signal.  Instead, the private enforcer 
could be expected to name the deep-pocketed firm as a defendant in 
every case it deemed economical to pursue.  Thus, getting sanctions 
“just right” is more important in a world with private enforcement 
than in one with only public enforcement. 
Ironically, it is also more difficult.  If the sanction paid by the de-
fendant is the recovery received by the private plaintiff, lawmakers will 
face a quandary that William Landes and Richard Posner long ago 
dubbed “the overenforcement theorem.”69  The quandary emerges 
because profit-driven private enforcement makes it impossible for 
lawmakers to set the probability of detection and the magnitude of 
sanctions independently.  To return to an earlier example, assume 
lawmakers raise the sanction for fraud from $100 (the actual social 
costs) to $200 in an attempt to compensate for a 50% probability of 
nonenforcement.  Private parties would predictably respond to the 
higher potential recovery by investing more resources in enforcement, 
 
68 See Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 38 (observing that discretionary non-
enforcement “would not be a feature of private enforcement:  all laws would be en-
forced that yielded a positive expected net return”). 
69 Id. at 15. 
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which would increase the probability of enforcement and in turn in-
crease the expected sanction beyond its efficient level.  If lawmakers 
responded by decreasing the sanction, enforcement would drop, and 
the problem would manifest in reverse.  The upshot is that lawmakers 
would be hard-pressed to reach an enforcement equilibrium in a 
world with private enforcement.70  With exclusive public enforcement, 
by contrast, a “high fine need not be taken as a signal to invest greater 
resources in crime prevention, since the public enforcer is not con-
strained to act as a private profit maximizer.”71  Thus, expected sanc-
tions could be more stably set. 
The overenforcement theorem can be solved if the sanction paid 
by the defendant is “decoupled” from the bounty received by the pri-
vate enforcer; in class action litigation, for example, the plaintiffs’ at-
torney (who is the real impetus behind the suit) recovers only a por-
tion of the sanction paid by the defendant.  But this solution 
introduces its own problem:  it “would drive a wedge between what of-
fenders paid and what enforcers received,” and thereby create oppor-
tunities for collusive settlements.72  And it would still leave lawmakers 
with the unenviable task of attempting to craft the “optimal” sanc-
tion, which is, even apart from the complications introduced by the 
overenforcement theorem, exceedingly difficult to do for reasons 
previously discussed. 
For purposes of this Article, the important point to take away is that 
private enforcement introduces a host of costs that could be avoided if 
lawmakers relied instead on a well-incentivized public enforcer.  Only if 
we question the motivations of the public enforcer (or the government 
actors who control it) does private enforcement emerge as a potentially 
rational approach to securities fraud deterrence. 
 
70 Contract breaches and common law torts (including common law fraud actions 
that involve privity of dealing between the victim and the fraudster) may have a detec-
tion rate close to 100%.  If so, private enforcement would not cause the instability 
problem described here and would therefore be less of a concern.  See id. (explaining 
why the overenforcement theorem does not become a problem when the detection 
rate is 100%).  Private enforcement would remain problematic, however, if inaccurate 
prosecution and legal error were significant concerns, or if the violation called for 
conditional deterrence and sanctions were particularly difficult to calculate. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 24.  These opportunities arise because both parties would be better off 
negotiating a settlement for an amount that is less than the sanction facing the defen-
dant but more than the bounty promised the enforcer.  While settlements could be 
made subject to court approval, this is unlikely to be a foolproof remedy.  See Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1652 n.106 (2009) 
(quoting commentators who explain why courts tend to favor even poor settlements).   
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2.  Concurrent vs. Exclusive Enforcement 
Part II explained why a well-incentivized enforcer may be better 
positioned to minimize the net social costs of a securities fraud deter-
rence regime (through careful use of prosecutorial discretion) than 
lawmakers or courts (through more formal, and predictably intermit-
tent, adjustments of substance, sanctions, and procedure).  That dis-
cussion assumed, however, that only one enforcer would be calling the 
shots.  If instead concurrent enforcers were employed—that is, if mul-
tiple enforcers shared jurisdiction over the same regulated parties, 
with none exercising control over the discretionary enforcement deci-
sions of the others (as do the SEC and state securities regulators)—
prosecutorial discretion would lose much of its luster.  Even if each 
enforcer were well incentivized to promote optimal deterrence, con-
current enforcers might rationally pursue enforcement strategies that, 
in combination, would lead to perverse results. 
A simple example illustrates this point.  Assume lawmakers have 
granted two enforcers, X and Y, concurrent enforcement authority 
over Firm A and its agents and affiliates.  Both X and Y have recently 
come to believe that the securities fraud deterrence regime is produc-
ing excessive underdeterrence costs (i.e., that the regime could be ad-
justed in some way that would save more in underdeterrence costs 
than it would create in new enforcement costs).  A variety of potential 
fixes are available; for example, aiders and abetters might be pursued 
more aggressively, higher sanctions might be imposed, more cases 
might be brought (increasing the probability of enforcement and, 
thus, expected sanctions), and so forth.  Any of the foregoing adjust-
ments to the regime could be anticipated to lower underdeterrence 
costs, albeit at the price of some (hopefully smaller) increase in over-
deterrence costs.  However, if X and Y make adjustments simulta-
neously, the combined effect might very well overshoot the mark. 
Assume, for instance, that X doubles the sanctions it seeks to im-
pose on violators, whereas Y doubles the number of enforcement ac-
tions it brings.  Firm A and its agents and affiliates—who, recall, are 
susceptible to prosecution by both X and Y—would then face ex-
pected sanctions higher than intended by either X or Y.  Whereas X’s 
or Y’s adjustment may have been efficient standing alone, in combina-
tion their adjustments may be less efficient, or may in fact do more 
harm than good (by increasing enforcement costs more than they de-
crease underdeterrence costs).  Similar complications might arise if X 
and Y simultaneously reduce enforcement efforts in an attempt to mi-
tigate excessive overdeterrence. 
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There is an obvious rejoinder to this concern:  X and Y could—
and, given our assumption of public-spiritedness, presumably would—
voluntarily coordinate their enforcement efforts.  They might consult 
with one another before making adjustments in enforcement policy, 
for example, or resolve to focus their energies on different types of 
firms, allocating responsibility in a way that caters to each enforcer’s 
comparative advantage.  But coordination requires effort and thus is 
not costless.  The greater the number of enforcers, the costlier it will 
be.  More worrisome, voluntary coordination can break down if disa-
greements arise over the best enforcement approach.  This is a realis-
tic possibility, even among well-incentivized enforcers, given the signif-
icant empirical uncertainty that will exist regarding the relative level 
of under- and overdeterrence costs. 
If such a breakdown occurs, the enforcer concerned about under-
deterrence will always stand in a position to thwart the efforts of the 
enforcer who is concerned about overdeterrence, leading to a poten-
tially ill-advised ratcheting up of enforcement intensity.  This is be-
cause market participants will predictably respond to the signals of the 
strictest enforcer with authority over them and conform their beha-
vior accordingly.  Thus, assume that X, in an effort to mitigate over-
deterrence, chooses to forgo pursuing significant sanctions against 
firms that can demonstrate that they made good-faith efforts to create 
and maintain cost-effective internal controls, or decides to use ex-
treme caution in pursuing claims premised on forward-looking state-
ments, believing that such claims chill desirable disclosure.  If Y disa-
grees that overdeterrence is a problem, and thus seeks heavy sanctions 
against firms notwithstanding a showing of good faith, or aggressively 
prosecutes cases involving forward-looking statements, it will defeat 
X’s efforts to cabin overdeterrence costs. 
Without some affirmative reason to think that tougher enforce-
ment is always better, it is unclear why lawmakers should opt for a sys-
tem that is structurally biased in this way.  The better approach would 
be to select the enforcer most likely to get enforcement policy right 
with respect to a particular group of regulated parties, and to grant 
that enforcer exclusive authority over them. 
3.  Federal vs. State Enforcement 
All else being equal, then, in a world with faithful government 
agents the potential for achieving optimal deterrence is enhanced if 
regulated parties are subject to an exclusive securities fraud enforcer, 
and a public one at that.  But should this enforcer be accountable to 
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the federal government or to a particular state government?  Scholar-
ship on the “economics of federalism” provides a principle to guide 
the assignment of jurisdiction.  It instructs that 
[i]f the costs and benefits of an action, whether public or private, stray 
across jurisdictional lines, then the highest level of government that can 
fully internalize the costs and benefits of the action ought to take re-
sponsibility.  Only then will a governmental authority have the appropri-
ate incentives to regulate the externality-generating activity.
73
 
This formulation supports assigning the federal government responsi-
bility for deterring fraud in the national securities markets, while as-
signing state governments responsibility for deterring fraud targeted 
at their respective local capital markets. 
No individual state would fully capture the benefits of designing 
an “optimal” liability regime for deterring fraud in the national securi-
ties markets, as those benefits would spill over to the national econo-
my.  As a result, states would predictably underinvest in the effort.  
They might, for example, devote their limited resources to issues of 
more local concern, neglecting national securities frauds.  Conversely, 
they might use their authority aggressively to impose monetary sanc-
tions on offenders to generate revenue for their state, without fully in-
ternalizing the potential overdeterrence costs of their actions.  As Sa-
muel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey explained, “Elected state 
officials could well respond to the political preferences of the voters of 
any particular state yielding ‘intrajurisdictional efficiency’ at the ex-
pense of the ‘interjurisdictional efficiency’ concerns of the polity writ 
large.  The end result could be underregulation or overregulation.”74 
If the preconditions for effective “regulatory competition” existed, 
the natural misalignment of states’ incentives could theoretically be 
overcome, and assigning jurisdiction to the states, rather than the fed-
eral government, would be preferable.75  These preconditions include 
(1) that each firm is allowed to choose which state’s securities fraud 
liability regime will have exclusive jurisdiction over it; (2) that a suffi-
ciently large number of states compete to attract and retain such 
 
73 Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 921, 928 (1998).   
74 Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1387 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (citing Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Ru-
binfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:  Balancing Political Participation 
and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1234 (1997)).  
75 This idea is traceable to Charles M. Tiebout’s seminal article, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).   
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firms, lured by the prospect of fees or other benefits to the state that 
flow from being chosen; (3) that firms are able to switch between 
competing jurisdictions cheaply; (4) that investors desire a securities 
fraud liability regime that best approximates optimal deterrence; (5) 
that investors are able to discern differences in regulatory approaches, 
and thus to identify the jurisdiction that best approximates optimal 
deterrence and reward firms that choose it; and, finally, (6) that firms’ 
agents are responsive to investors. 
A functioning system of this sort would offer an important advan-
tage over assigning the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to 
police fraud in the national securities markets:  it would generate crit-
ical information about the efficacy of regulatory choices.  As the dis-
cussion thus far has illustrated, the task of crafting an optimal securi-
ties fraud liability regime is beset with uncertainty.  To return to our 
recent examples, would Enforcer X’s or Enforcer Y’s enforcement 
policies better approximate optimal deterrence?  It is impossible to say 
as a matter of theory.  Under the conditions of regulatory competition 
spelled out above, however, these various approaches could each be 
implemented, and their effects observed, and ultimately judged, by 
investors.  The migration of firms to a particular jurisdiction would 
indicate that the jurisdiction had selected the most efficient regulatory 
approach.76  If the preconditions spelled out above are not met, how-
ever, it would be difficult to judge the meaning of the information 
regulatory competition produced, and Occam’s Razor would counsel 
in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction.77 
 
76 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 45 (2002) (“Competing regulators would make fewer policy 
mistakes than a single regulator as competition harnesses the incentives of the mar-
ket to regulatory institutions.”). 
77 The debate over regulatory competition as it relates to corporate law continues.  
See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (ar-
guing that state competition for revenues from corporate charters has produced a sys-
tem that, for the most part, benefits investors); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1435 (1992) (suggesting limitations of state charter competition and advocating in-
creased federal involvement in corporate law); Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption 
in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067 (2008) (positing that federal 
preemption of securities law enhances competition); William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (proposing increased 
federal interest in corporate law in light of Delaware’s lead in the “race to the bottom”); 
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that state corporate regulation is superior to federal). 
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4.  Other Considerations 
Before asking how relaxing our assumption of social welfare–
maximizing public servants changes the analysis, it is worth pausing to 
explore briefly a few other considerations that are commonly advanced 
in support of concurrent state and private enforcement.  Closer analy-
sis reveals that these considerations either (1) are unpersuasive in a 
world with faithful government agents or (2) potentially support a role 
for states or private parties in securities fraud deterrence very different 
from the one they currently play in the United States. 
a.  Detection Advantages 
It is sometimes suggested that states or private parties may be better 
positioned to detect fraud than the federal government.78  State regula-
tors, for example, may be more accessible than their federal counter-
parts to investors complaining of fraudulent practices, and employees 
likely stand in the best position to uncover fraud at their employing 
firms.  But even assuming that states and private parties do enjoy certain 
detection advantages, it does not follow that they ought to be granted 
concurrent enforcement authority.  The federal government could in-
stead offer them inducements to provide information to the federal en-
forcer, or permit them to sue subject to the federal enforcer’s oversight.  
This approach would allow the federal government to exploit the detec-
tion capabilities of state regulators and private parties, while avoiding 
the potential complications that can arise when multiple independent 
enforcers are employed.  Such an approach would differ markedly from 
the approach currently taken in the United States, which gives the SEC 
no control over state or private enforcement efforts, and in fact permits 
states to craft substantive rules, sanctions, and procedural rules in ways 
that diverge from federal law. 
b.  Enforcement Efficiencies 
It is also sometimes suggested that enforcement efforts may be 
undertaken more efficiently in a regime that relies on private rights of 
action than in one that relies on a government enforcement bureau-
 
78 See, e.g., NASAA to Obama:  Limiting Preemption Protects Investors, NASAA INSIGHT 
(N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Wash., D.C.), Spring/Summer 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/NASAA_Insight_SpringSummer09.pdf (touting 
state regulators’ role in fraud detection given, in the words of then-NASAA President 
and Colorado Securities Commissioner Fred Joseph, their “unique proximity to inves-
tors and to the industry participants within their state borders”). 
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cracy.79  But, assuming as we are that the public enforcer acts to pro-
mote optimal deterrence, there is no reason to think that private en-
forcers will make more cost-effective choices as viewed from a societal 
perspective; indeed, the opposite should be expected.80  Moreover, 
public enforcement may provide economies of scale in the detection 
and prosecution of offenses that cannot easily be replicated in a re-
gime of private enforcement.81 
c.  Resource Constraints 
It is also often argued that budgetary constraints at the federal lev-
el warrant supplementary enforcement by the states or private parties.82  
This argument, like the last, proceeds from a jaundiced view of public 
servants and thus is more appropriately treated in the next Section:  in 
a world filled with public-spirited politicians, the budget afforded the 
federal securities fraud enforcer would, ipso facto, be set at an amount 
believed to be socially optimal.  If politicians lacked adequate funds, 
they would raise taxes.  But let us nevertheless assume that resource 
constraints might be a problem, even in a world with faithful govern-
ment agents.  It does not follow that granting multiple enforcers full, 
concurrent enforcement authority is the answer.  The federal enforcer 
 
79 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:  Why the Model of 
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 224-25 (1983) (asserting 
that while it might be “more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection,” 
litigation should be left to private enforcers). 
80 As Louis Kaplow observed,  
[A] general belief in the efficient functioning of the markets does not provide 
any basis for inferring good results in adjudication (unless the form of adjudi-
cation was itself chosen in the market, as when it is specified by contract).  
The reason is that virtually every act of a litigant, by design, hurts the oppo-
nent; externalities are thus a central characteristic of behavior in litigation.  
This fundamental difference between litigation and other goods and services 
is often overlooked. 
Kaplow, supra note 52, at 338 n.87. 
81 See SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 581 (suggesting that if private enforcement 
were used in situations where effort must be expended to identify and apprehend 
violators, it would best be “undertaken by a large organization that has the basic 
characteristics of public enforcement organizations”).  
82 See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism:  Competition, Cooperation and Securi-
ties Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 126-27 (2005) (“Because the SEC lacks ade-
quate resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental en-
forcement is essential to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.”); Langevoort, 
supra note 16, at 652 (accepting “the conventional view that private litigation is a ne-
cessary supplement to SEC enforcement” because of federal resource constraints, 
while suggesting that Rule 10b-5 class actions could be eliminated entirely “in a world 
with an optimally staffed SEC”). 
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could be relieved of its budgetary pressure if states or private parties 
were granted the right to sue subject to the federal enforcer’s continued 
oversight and control.  The federal enforcer could use its oversight au-
thority to prevent duplication of effort and to ensure that neither states 
nor private parties pursued cases not in the public interest.  This way, 
supplemental enforcement resources could be marshalled without sa-
crificing the advantages of exclusive federal enforcement.83 
d.  “Laboratories of Democracy” 
No metaphor is as often, and as inappropriately, used to support 
concurrent state enforcement as Justice Brandeis’s famous reference to 
the states as democratic “laboratories” of policy experimentation.84  
First, there is nothing democratic about allowing one state to set na-
tional policy.  Giving states concurrent authority to enforce a deter-
rence regime targeted at national securities frauds effectively does this 
because, as explained above, regulated parties will conform their beha-
vior to meet the demands of the strictest regulator with authority over 
them.  Thus, the vast majority of states across the nation could want to 
reduce excessive overdeterrence costs, but if a lone state decides  
underdeterrence is the bigger concern, it could single-handedly un-
dermine the majority view by intensifying its enforcement policies.85    
Second, in a regime of concurrent enforcement (in sharp contrast to a 
regime of true regulatory competition) the import of the states’ “expe-
riments” with securities fraud deterrence will be impossible to discern, 
given that the combined choices of multiple enforcers will be responsi-
ble for a single outcome.  This result, too, has antidemocratic implica-
tions because it obscures accountability. 
B.  Public Servants as . . . Something Else 
Let us now drop our Pollyanna assumption and take a more realis-
tic view.  Public servants surely act to maximize their individual wel-
fare, rather than the social welfare of the jurisdictions they serve—at 
 
83 For such a system to be effective, states and private parties would have to be giv-
en appropriate incentives to pursue cases notwithstanding the potential intervention of 
the federal enforcer.  See Rose, supra note 8, at 1357 & n.253 (describing mechanisms 
to maintain such incentives in an oversight regime). 
84 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may . . . serve as a laboratory . . . .”). 
85 State regulation of purely intrastate frauds, by contrast, clearly does promote 
democratic principles due to the absence of any spillover effects. 
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least some of the time.  They are also human beings and are bound to 
make mistakes.  What impact does this have on our preference for an 
exclusive federal enforcer?86  More specifically, does it justify a multi-
enforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence like the one taken in 
the United States?  Some supporters of the current regime contend 
that the answer is yes.  They warn of SEC capture and complacency, 
make assertions regarding the relative competencies of government 
and profit-motivated lawyers, and argue that Congress cannot be 
trusted to use its influence over the SEC in socially desirable ways.87  
But these assertions tend to be poorly specified,88 and alone they fail 
to do the work needed to justify the concurrent use of federal, state, 
and private enforcers. 
Three things must be true—in addition to the assumption of im-
perfect government actors—for a multienforcer approach to promote 
optimal securities fraud deterrence.  As elaborated below, it must first 
 
86 How this reality affects a preference for regulatory competition among states is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
87 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post 
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 99 (2008) (observing that “securities class ac-
tions . . . guard against selective enforcement and inaction by the SEC” and “over-
come[] lackluster governmental incentives”); Jones, supra note 82, at 122 (arguing in 
favor of dual state/federal securities enforcement because “the existence of multiple 
layers of government makes regulatory capture a more arduous task for interest 
groups”); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the 
Regulation of Corporate Governance:  The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 951, 958 (2005) (suggesting that the SEC’s passivity in the wake of recent 
corporate scandals “was likely caused by the agency’s capture by the very special interests 
it was ostensibly regulating,” along with “the acquiescence of Congress and the relevant 
oversight committees that monitor the SEC and control its budget”).  
88 Criticisms of the SEC also tend to be only anecdotally supported.  There are, 
however, some notable recent exceptions.  See Maria M. Correia, Political Connections, 
SEC Enforcement and Accounting Quality 4 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Work-
ing Paper No. 61, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458478 (presenting 
evidence “that firms with low accounting quality have greater political expenditures on 
average” and that they increase these expenditures “during the period of misreporting 
and are more likely to target them to the Congressional Committees with stronger ties 
to the SEC during this period”); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry:  
Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers 64-65 (Aug. 11, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333717 (presenting evi-
dence that the SEC treats big broker-dealer firms and their employees more favorably 
than they treat smaller broker-dealer firms and their employees, thus providing tenta-
tive support for the proposition that SEC officials treat defendants that could be their 
prospective employers preferentially); Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying 
and Fraud Detection 29 (Feb. 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=954368 (presenting evidence showing that lobbying firms 
have a lower fraud detection rate and evade detection longer than nonlobbying firms, 
and that fraudulent firms spend more on lobbying than nonfraudulent firms). 
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be the case that the federal enforcer, if given exclusive enforcement au-
thority, would systematically deviate from optimality by excessively  
underdeterring national securities frauds.  If, instead, the federal en-
forcer systematically erred on the side of excessive enforcement, addi-
tional enforcers would be no antidote.  Second, it must also be the case 
that exposing market participants to concurrent state or private en-
forcement would save more in underdeterrence costs than it would 
create in additional enforcement costs.  Were it otherwise, using mul-
tiple enforcers would leave society worse off.  Finally, it must be true 
that a greater net savings in social costs could not be realized by adopt-
ing alternative reforms designed to align more closely the federal en-
forcer’s incentives with the national interest.  Such alternative reforms 
should not be overlooked, as they hold the promise of reintroducing 
the enforcer-based efficiencies discussed in Part II—efficiencies that are 
lost or weakened when multiple enforcers are employed. 
1.  Systematic Underdeterrence? 
One should not leap from the assumption of imperfect government 
actors to the conclusion that an exclusive federal enforcer would syste-
matically underdeter.  Predicting actual regulatory outputs requires a 
host of additional theoretical and empirical assumptions—assumptions 
that we should make explicit and carefully examine.  The most funda-
mental of these is the presumed motivation of government actors.  
What drives government behavior, if not pure public-spiritedness?  The 
answer one offers to this question, and the further assumptions one 
makes about the particular political economy under examination, will 
inform one’s judgment about whether an exclusive federal enforcer 
would systematically underdeter.  It will also inform one’s judgment 
about whether concurrent state enforcement would do more harm 
than good, and the types of alternative reforms best suited to deal with 
systematic underdeterrence (should it prove to be a risk).  Thus, much 
is lost by glossing over these specifics. 
Two common motivational assumptions are briefly discussed be-
low.  The first is premised on public-choice postulates and the second 
on the teachings of psychology and organizational theory.  As the dis-
cussion illustrates, neither leads inevitably to the conclusion that an 
exclusive federal enforcer would systematically underdeter. 
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a.  A Public-Choice Account 
Public-choice theory posits that people in government, like every-
one else, act rationally to maximize their own utility.89  If we ascribe 
this motivation to government actors, what would it suggest about the 
behavior of an exclusive federal securities fraud enforcer? 
One cannot begin to answer that question without making yet 
another assumption, this time concerning the relationship between 
legislators and the enforcement agency.  One school of thought is 
that administrative agencies like the SEC are under the effective con-
trol of Congress, and, more specifically, the congressional subcom-
mittees responsible for the agency’s oversight.90  According to this so-
called “congressional dominance” model, we should look to the utili-
ty function of the members of the relevant subcommittees when pre-
dicting the agency’s behavior.91  A competing assumption is that con-
gressional control over the bureaucracy is incomplete, and that 
agencies therefore retain substantial discretion in carrying out their 
duties.92  Under this so-called “bureaucratic slack” model, one should 
focus on the utility functions of those within the agency, as well.93  
Both assumptions are discussed below.  Neither points clearly in the 
direction of systematic underdeterrence. 
i.  Congressional Dominance 
What would members of the relevant congressional subcommit-
tees prefer when it comes to securities fraud enforcement?  A simplify-
 
89  See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 1-2 (2003) (“The basic behavioral 
postulate of public choice . . . is that man is an egotistic, rational, utility maximizer.”). 
90 See Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System:  A Principal Agent 
Perspective (With Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 149 (1984) (arguing that 
“[i]t is not a bureaucratic imperative that drives agency decisionmaking but rather a 
congressional-electoral one” and detailing the mechanisms through which Congress 
exerts control).  
91 See id. at 150 (“For any particular agency . . .  it is not the Congress as a whole that is 
relevant for policymaking but rather the committee(s) with jurisdiction over the agency.”). 
92 “Bureaucracies have autonomy, it is often said, simply because the disciplinary 
weapons that external political forces might wield are imperfect . . . .”  Donald C. Lan-
gevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker:  Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1602 (2006).  Moreover, intra-agency agency costs may lead 
to “outcomes that diverge from what even the agency itself, if we imagine it anthropo-
morphically, would consider to be in its best interest.”  Id. at 1603. 
93 See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional 
Control?  Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 
767 (1983) (describing the view that “bureaucratic insulation affords bureaucrats a de-
gree of discretion which, in turn, is used to pursue their own private goals”). 
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ing assumption employed in the public-choice literature is that legisla-
tors are “political support maximizers”—meaning that they use their 
influence over the bureaucracy in whatever way maximizes their like-
lihood of reelection.94  This assumption, in turn, begs another ques-
tion:  how do politicians maximize the likelihood of their reelection?  
The answer, of course, is that it depends on the context. 
One possibility is that politicians maximize their reelection 
chances by advancing the policy preferences of their constituents. If 
this is correct, the next question becomes what those voters will prefer 
with respect to securities fraud enforcement.  It seems unlikely that 
the right answer is “systematic underdeterrence.”  It is more probable 
that voters would favor excessive enforcement.  Securities fraud is, af-
ter all, an issue that garners the ire of citizens,95 who likely fail to ap-
preciate the less visible costs of overdeterrence.96  Voter-responsive 
politicians might therefore push the agency to overenforce, at least in 
the wake of well-publicized corporate scandals.97 
But in the absence of headlines focusing their attention on the is-
sue, voters may not pay much attention to politicians’ positions on 
securities fraud enforcement.98  Legislators’ political support–
maximizing strategy during these quiet times might therefore be to 
defer to special interest groups, who promise in return to support the 
legislators’ reelection bids.  If this were the case, what would it por-
tend for securities fraud enforcement?  Again, more information is 
 
94 Cf. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 42 (1998) (noting that although “it seems safe to assume that leg-
islators seek to retain their positions in office,” there are problems with assigning too 
much weight to legislators’ electoral goals). 
95 See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70:  Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1073, 1078 (2005) (noting the “public outrage” over corporate accounting frauds fol-
lowing the collapse of Enron and Worldcom). 
96 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 16, 45 (2003) (observing that “investors are likely to exaggerate the like-
lihood of fraud given its salience,” while often ignoring the “widely dispersed, and thus 
less observable, potential benefits from reducing regulatory costs”). 
97 See Pritchard, supra note 95, at 1078, 1082 (describing the “political overreaction 
to the fallout of corruption revealed by a bear market,” and observing that scandal-
driven reforms spurred by a desire on the part of politicians to “‘do something[]’ . . . 
may prove to be costly, ineffective or counterproductive”).   
98 See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation:  A Political 
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 561 (2001) (“[D]uring periods of ‘normal’ 
politics when securities-related issues are not on the ‘public agenda,’ . . . most voters do 
not concern themselves with the ordinary activities of the SEC.”) (footnote omitted) 
(citing Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and 
the Public Agenda:  Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167 (1990)). 
ROSE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:02 PM 
2010] Securities Fraud Deterrence 2215 
needed.  What special interest groups would dominate, and what 
would they want?  After all, if legislators were “captured” by a group 
interested in optimal deterrence, the result would count against a  
multienforcer approach. 
It is not unrealistic to believe that such a well-meaning lobby might 
capture politicians.99  One would not expect institutional investors, for 
example, to lobby for systematic underdeterrence, and there is some 
evidence that these investors hold sway in Congress and, indirectly, over 
the SEC.100  Financial services firms, too, might be opposed to systematic 
underdeterrence, given that securities fraud hurts their bottom line by 
decreasing liquidity and chilling transactions.101  Securities fraud also 
clearly harms corporate issuers by raising the cost of capital.102 
This is not to say that no forces might emerge that prefer under-
deterrence.  Disloyal corporate managers or individual members of 
financial services firms, for example, might wish to commit fraud with 
impunity, or they may be honest but risk averse and fear the potential 
imposition of wrongful liability.  In either case, they may have an in-
centive to lobby for excessively light enforcement.  Moreover, even if 
financial services firms and corporate issuers support optimal securi-
ties fraud deterrence in theory, they might nonetheless lobby for a 
weakened enforcement agency if that agency possesses other regulatory 
authority over them that they wish to undermine.103 
The strength of any incentive on the part of individuals or firms to 
lobby for underdeterrence (or for a weakened enforcement agency 
more generally) must be evaluated, however, in light of the possibility 
 
99 See id. at 564 (“It may well be that the externalities of securities regulation are 
sufficiently small that what is good for capital-raising firms is good for America.”); Lan-
gevoort, supra note 92, at 1599 (“[W]e could expect a reasonably vigorous antifraud 
program from the SEC even with general industry capture . . . .”). 
100 See generally Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange:  The Causes and Effects of De-
regulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1984) (applying a political support–maximization 
theory to explain the SEC’s abolition of fixed-rate commissions on the NYSE in the 
face of the rise of institutional investors as a powerful interest group). 
101 See Pritchard, supra note 61, at 966-76 (explaining that floor traders, market 
makers, and brokers should be proponents of vigorous antifraud enforcement given 
fraud’s effect on liquidity and transaction volume). 
102 See supra subsection I.A.1 (explaining how securities fraud works to increase 
firms’ cost of capital). 
103 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal:  Three Narratives in 
Search of a Story 16 (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, Research Paper No. 
1475433, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475433 (“It is not because Wall 
Street wants to protect someone like Bernie Madoff, but because the abundance of 
tools and resources that might make [catching people like him] more likely . . . can 
too easily be put to use to threaten more sensitive interests.”).  
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mentioned at the outset:  when scandal breaks, politicians may shift 
loyalties to placate voter outrage, resulting in increased regulation 
and higher enforcement intensity.104  Anticipating this possibility, 
these actors may conclude that it is in their long-term best interest to 
support a robust deterrence regime that decreases the likelihood of 
scandals—and the harsh regulatory consequences that tend to follow 
in their wake. 
My purpose here is not to make an actual prediction about which 
group, if any, would succeed at “capturing” the relevant congressional 
subcommittees, nor is it to guess what that would mean for securities 
fraud deterrence.  Instead, the discussion is meant simply to illustrate 
that under some of the most standard assumptions in the public-
choice literature, it is not obvious that we should expect excessive  
underdeterrence from exclusive federal enforcement. 
ii.  Bureaucratic Slack 
According to the “bureaucratic slack” model, to predict agency 
behavior we should focus not only on the utility functions of the 
members of the relevant congressional subcommittees, but also on 
those of enforcement-agency personnel.  What would motivate the 
personnel of an exclusive federal securities fraud enforcer, and what 
does this suggest about the likelihood of systematic underdeterrence?  
The answer, again, depends on the context. 
For example, if agency personnel care primarily about increasing 
their leisure time, systematic underdeterrence is likely.  If, however, 
they wish above all else to expand the jurisdiction and resources of the 
agency they serve, it is less clear that systematic underdeterrence 
would be the dominant strategy.  If, instead, agency personnel care 
mostly about maximizing their future employment prospects, the im-
plications are similarly uncertain.  If future employers prefer weak se-
curities fraud enforcement, agency personnel might underdeter in an 
attempt to curry favor.  But that may not be the right assumption.  For 
reasons discussed above, financial services firms and corporate issuers 
may prefer an optimal securities fraud deterrence regime.  And, in 
any event, these may not be the future employers that enforcement 
agency personnel have in mind.  Instead, agency personnel may antic-
ipate employment at one of a handful of white-shoe law firms—firms 
that make money defending against securities fraud enforcement ac-
tions, not sitting on their hands.  Thus, it has been observed that SEC 
 
104 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement personnel may not maximize their career value by cater-
ing to Wall Street but rather “from having a reputation for being quite 
aggressive.”105  By being aggressive, enforcement agency personnel not 
only serve the interests of the securities defense bar in general,106 but 
they also underscore how lucrative their relationships with agency in-
siders could be to future clients.  Moreover, aggressive enforcement 
provides agency personnel with more opportunities to gain valuable 
litigation experience. 
A caveat is again in order:  my goal here is not to offer a predic-
tion about the likely motivations of agency personnel, but simply to 
illustrate the uncertainty of the proposition that excessive under-
deterrence would necessarily flow from exclusive federal securities 
fraud enforcement—even if one concedes that a so-called “revolving 
door” exists between government and the private sector. 
b.  A Behavioral Account 
Rather than highlighting the pursuit of self-interest as the main 
reason government actors may deviate from the public interest, a be-
havioral perspective would give primacy to certain cognitive biases 
likely to infect even a well-meaning agency’s operations.107  In the con-
text of securities fraud, a number of well-chronicled cognitive biases 
could be expected to skew an enforcement agency’s cost-benefit calcu-
lations, leading to suboptimal deterrence.108 
For example, the “so-called ‘availability heuristic,’ whereby salient 
risks are more available to one’s mind and thus receive more atten-
tion, as well as the ‘representativeness heuristic’ and ‘probability neg-
lect,’ according to which people tend to overstate the probability of 
some bad recent event occurring again in the future,”109 could lead 
agency personnel to place undue weight on the risk of fraud (which 
they see realized on a daily basis) relative to the less-visible risk of 
overdeterrence.  This tendency may be exacerbated by “loss aversion,” 
 
105 Langevoort, supra note 92, at 1621. 
106 Id. 
107 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 56, at 562-82 (comparing public-choice and 
psychological explanations for government error). 
108 For a catalog of the behavioral biases that may plague an organization like the 
SEC, see Choi & Pritchard, supra note 96, at 21-36.  Behavioral biases may also affect 
securities fraud enforcement by influencing lawmakers’ decisions regarding the scope 
of the enforcer’s authority and the size of the enforcer’s budget. 
109 Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:  The SEC’s Regulatory Phi-
losophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1008.   
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or “the idea that people disfavor a loss more than they value a similar 
gain,” which may likewise cause agency personnel to “focus[] on pre-
venting losses caused by fraud at the expense of yet-to-be realized 
benefits” in the form of reduced overdeterrence costs.110 
The so-called “self-serving inference,” whereby the mind in ambi-
guous situations “tends to form stronger-than-justifiable inferences in 
the direction of a person’s self-interest,”111 may also exacerbate the 
tendency to overweigh underdeterrence costs relative to over-
deterrence costs.  This result may occur if “good economic outcomes 
(e.g., lowering the cost of capital or creating more competitive mar-
kets) are hard for [agency personnel] to take credit for, while bad 
ones (e.g., scandals and troubles) generate intense criticism.”112  Fi-
nally, features of the agency’s culture—its “source of shared sense-
making”113—may also place a thumb on the scale.  It has been ob-
served that the SEC, for example, has a strong “investor protection” 
ethos and that those in its enforcement division are the most zealous 
in carrying it out.114 
Notably, the foregoing all portends excessive enforcement, not the 
type of systematic underdeterrence that could potentially justify a  
multienforcer approach.  But one could tell other plausible behavioral 
stories.  For example, loss aversion might lead to underdeterrence if 
agency personnel, fearful of taking on a powerful defendant and los-
ing, come to favor the pursuit of smaller fraudsters.115  The “self-serving 
inference” might bolster this tendency, too, if, for example, the agency 
is resource constrained,116 or if forgoing pursuit of large defendants 
 
110 Id. at 1021 n.176. 
111 Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their Corporate 
Clients’ Stock, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 574 (2002). 
112 Langevoort, supra note 92, at 1611. 
113 Id. at 1606. 
114 See Pritchard, supra note 95, at 1083-84 (noting former SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt’s statement, “Investor protection is our legal mandate.  Investor protection is our 
moral responsibility.  Investor protection is my top personal priority.”) (quoting Arthur 
Levitt, Former Chairman, SEC, A Question of Integrity:  Promoting Investor Confi-
dence by Fighting Insider Trading, Remarks at the “S.E.C. Speaks” Conference (Feb. 
27, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/ 
1998/spch202.txt)). 
115 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with the assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC 
Enforcement Heuristics:  An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 778 (2003) (“[T]he SEC’s 
focus on firms in financial distress, coupled with its preoccupation with small capitali-
zation firms, is . . . consistent with the hypothesis that the SEC, at least during the 
[time period studied], preferred weak opponents.”).  
116 See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 8-9 (positing this theory). 
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advances the career interests of agency personnel.117  Moreover, if 
agency personnel hail from the private sector (as is often the case at 
the SEC), they may “have become ‘socialized’ [to share the private sec-
tor’s] concerns and aspirations, carrying this perspective into their 
regulatory tasks.”118  If that perspective places undue weight on over-
deterrence costs, it could likewise lead to excessive underdeterrence. 119   
Again, the point of this brief and necessarily superficial discus-
sion is not to make predictions about regulatory outputs, but rather 
to highlight the precariousness of drawing casual conclusions about 
the likely behavior of an exclusive federal enforcer.  That such an en-
forcer would systematically underdeter is a proposition that must be 
defended, not merely asserted. 
2.  Net Savings in Social Costs? 
But let us assume for purposes of discussion that an exclusive fed-
eral enforcer would systematically underdeter.  Undoubtedly, many 
believe this would be the case with a monopolistic SEC, either because 
a captured Congress would deny it sufficient funds to do its job prop-
erly, or because SEC personnel would—for whatever reason—lack the 
will to prosecute fraud aggressively.120  Even so, for a multienforcer 
approach to be desirable it must also be true that exposing market 
participants to concurrent state or private enforcement would save 
more in underdeterrence costs than it would create in additional en-
forcement costs.  Determining whether this condition is satisfied re-
quires an analysis of the likely net value of private and state enforce-
ment.  To be sure, this sort of analysis is hard to conduct with 
confidence.  But if one cares about the efficiency of the U.S. securities 
fraud deterrence regime, it is a challenge that one cannot ignore. 
What follows are some very preliminary thoughts on the costs and 
benefits associated with the use of private and state enforcers in the 
 
117 See Langevoort, supra note 92, at 1610 (hypothesizing that agency “culture takes 
on a self-serving character, causing perceptions and inferences that comfortably coin-
cide with career interests”). 
118 Gadinis, supra note 88, at 50. 
119 An enforcement agency, however, is likely to be dominated by litigators, who 
may naturally be inclined “toward an expansive view of the law that is disconnected 
from cost-benefit analysis and leads to a more moralistic, ‘right versus wrong’ judg-
mental style.”  Langevoort, supra note 92, at 1621.  Moreover, securities lawyers as a 
class may tend to “see more value to regulation than there really is, because they have 
expertise that generates rents and are motivated to see legitimacy in that to which they 
have committed their . . . careers.”  Id. at 1610 (footnote omitted). 
120 See, e.g., supra notes 82, 87.   
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United States.  The discussion illustrates that it is very much an open 
question whether these enforcers do more good than harm—a ques-
tion that calls for considerable future research. 
a.  Private Enforcement 
The drawbacks of private securities fraud enforcement were de-
scribed generally in subsection III.A.1.  These drawbacks include the 
fact that profit-driven private enforcers are more likely to bring bor-
derline cases than public enforcers, thus increasing the risk of legal 
error and, in turn, overdeterrence.  This concern is far less significant 
in the United States today than it once was.  A series of congressional 
and judicial reforms of Rule 10b-5 class actions—including stricter 
pleading requirements, a statutory safe-harbor for forward-looking 
statements, a discovery stay pending decision on a motion to dismiss, 
and the elimination of aiding-and-abetting liability—now strongly dis-
courage private plaintiffs from bringing marginal suits.121 
These reforms might lead one to suspect that a happy medium has 
been reached, with private plaintiffs authorized to bring cases unlikely 
to provoke significant overdeterrence costs and the SEC (and, in case 
it fails to do the job, state regulators) positioned to fill the residual en-
forcement gaps.  But such a conclusion ignores the fact that vicarious 
liability remains a feature of the private enforcement regime.  It is, in 
fact, the central feature of that regime, as individual defendants rarely 
contribute to private settlements.122  Because vicariously liable firms 
face private damage awards that likely far exceed the optimal sanc-
tion,123 Rule 10b-5 class actions still threaten to overdeter notwithstand-
ing the decreased likelihood of inaccurate prosecution and legal error. 
 
121 See supra note 62. 
122 See Michael Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions “Supplemental” to SEC En-
forcement?  An Empirical Analysis 30-31 (Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/penn-nyu2010.html 
(finding that 122 of 139 class actions filed parallel to an SEC proceeding between 2000 
and 2003 involved no payment by an officer or director). 
123 Damages in “fraud-on-the-market” Rule 10b-5 class actions are based on the 
out-of-pocket losses of all shareholders who purchased shares on the secondary market 
at a fraudulently inflated price.  Robert F. Serio et al., Basic Claims Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, in SECURITIES LITIGATION § 2:2.2[A][4] ( Jonathan C. Dickey ed., 2006).  
These losses, which shareholders can largely offset through diversification, bear no re-
lationship to—and likely far exceed—the true social costs of fraud.  See Langevoort, 
supra note 16, at 646 (observing that the measure of damages in secondary market 
fraud cases “is systematically excessive and dysfunctional”).   
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Yet the question remains:  are the savings in underdeterrence costs 
attributable to private enforcement worth it?  Here, reasonable minds 
may differ.  Small-scale fraudsters are relatively immune from private 
enforcement, because the damages (and hence attorneys’ fees) at stake 
are minimal.  Dishonest officers at large firms also have little to fear, 
beyond reputational damage, from Rule 10b-5 class actions because, as 
just noted, they are rarely called upon to contribute financially to the 
resolution of the litigation.  The deterrent pressure of Rule 10b-5 class 
actions is therefore likely felt most acutely at the firm level, incentivizing 
boards of large companies, either directly or through their insurers, to 
adopt internal controls to prevent fraud before it occurs.  The marginal 
benefit of this deterrent is unclear, however, given that firms already 
have significant incentives to avoid managerial fraud.124 
If private enforcers discovered significant amounts of fraud that 
would otherwise go undetected, it would count in their favor, but there 
are good reasons to doubt that private enforcement plays an important 
role in detection.125  In fact, private enforcement may impede effective 
detection.  Public enforcers may have a more difficult time encouraging 
firms to self-report fraud if by doing so firms expose themselves to 
crushing private liability.  Private enforcement might also weaken the 
effectiveness of public enforcement in other ways.  For example, the 
threat of a follow-on class action may discourage individuals from coo-
perating with public enforcers.  It might also affect the manner in 
which public enforcers resolve investigations.  For instance, the SEC’s 
routine practice of allowing firms to settle fraud charges without admit-
ting wrongdoing, something that arguably dilutes the reputational im-
pact of the public sanction, is clearly aimed at protecting firms from pa-
rallel private liability.126 
 
124 As noted in subsection I.A.2.a, securities fraud may best be thought of as a spe-
cies of managerial agency costs, which faithful directors should naturally seek to mi-
nimize.  In addition, a firm’s stock price is apt to take a significant hit upon revelation 
of fraud.  See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. 
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (finding that a firm’s reputation losses as a 
result of financial fraud “exceed[] the legal penalty by over 7.5 times, and . . . exceed[] 
the amount by which firm value was artificially inflated by more than 2.5 times”). 
125 See Alexander Dyck et al.,Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?  7-8, 12 (Univ. 
Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=891482 (concluding that private securities litigation uncovered only 3% of 
the frauds exposed between 1996 and 2004 in companies with more than $750 million 
in assets). 
126 See Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability (discuss-
ing this phenomenon), in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM:  USING CRIMINAL LAW 
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The foregoing musings hardly demonstrate that private enforce-
ment creates no net social benefits.  The reputational damage that 
private enforcement imposes, for example, may effectively deter offic-
ers and produce significant savings in underdeterrence costs.  The 
threat of class action litigation may also galvanize the attention of di-
rectors on the risk of managerial fraud, prompting boards to imple-
ment better internal controls than they otherwise would.  Moreover, 
private enforcement may have a positive effect on the SEC’s own de-
terrence efforts, to the extent that SEC enforcement personnel fear 
the class action bar exposing their inadequate job performance.  But 
the discussion does suggest that the question is close enough to war-
rant greater investigation by academics and policymakers, particularly 
when one takes into account the significant direct enforcement costs—
in terms of lawyers’ fees, judicial resources, and the like—associated 
with Rule 10b-5 class actions. 
b.  State Enforcement 
As explained in subsection III.A.3, state enforcers motivated to 
maximize the social welfare of their respective jurisdictions might neg-
lect national securities frauds (directing scarce state resources to is-
sues of more local concern) or, at the other extreme, impose draco-
nian sanctions on firms (as a way to raise revenue for their states).  But 
we cannot assume that state enforcers would act as social welfare max-
imizers while also assuming that an exclusive federal enforcer, and its 
political overseers, would not.  Thinking through the costs and bene-
fits of state enforcement demands that we assign the same skewed mo-
tivations to state officials that we assign to their federal counterparts.  
If, for example, we predict that an exclusive federal enforcer would 
systematically underdeter because members of the congressional over-
sight committee are “political support maximizers” who would be-
come “captured” by forces that prefer underdeterrence, consistency 
demands that we also assume that the elected overseers of state en-
forcers (or the state enforcers themselves, if they are elected officials) 
behave as political support maximizers.  What this portends for the 
value of concurrent state enforcement is uncertain. 
Under this assumption, state enforcement might serve as a valua-
ble corrective.  Forces that prefer optimal deterrence would need only 
capture one of the fifty states to overcome the clout of any special in-
 
TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 
forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 15-16, on file with the author).  
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terest groups that prefer underdeterrence.  This is because of the dy-
namic described in subsection III.A.2:  when there are concurrent en-
forcers, regulated parties will adjust their behavior to meet the 
mands of the strictest regulator with authority over them.  The mere 
possibility that this result could occur might have a disciplining effect 
at the federal level, thus working to reduce underdeterrence costs 
even when state enforcement efforts are dormant. 
But, by the same token, those who prefer excessive enforcement 
need capture only one state to introduce the possibility that state en-
forcement will do more harm than good.  Who would ever lobby for 
excessive state enforcement?  The plaintiffs’ bar would, if—as in the 
United States—private enforcement is also a feature of the regime.  
Empirical studies show that Rule 10b-5 class actions are likely to settle 
more quickly, and for more money, if the government has brought a 
parallel action against the defendant.127  Certain states also contract out 
(sometimes on a contingency fee basis) their securities fraud enforce-
ment cases to the private bar,128 creating a constituency of lawyers that 
may push for overly aggressive state enforcement.  Voter preferences 
might also lead state officials to favor excessive enforcement, if being 
responsive to voters happens to be officials’ political support–
maximizing strategy.  As explained above, because fraud is more salient 
than overdeterrence, voters are likely to overweigh underdeterrence 
costs relative to enforcement costs.  A “political entrepreneur”—such as 
a state enforcement official seeking to propel himself to a higher of-
fice—may “take advantage of the[se] biases of the electorate, playing up 
recent instances of fraud to gain electoral support.”129 
If instead of proceeding from public-choice assumptions about 
regulatory behavior, we predict that an exclusive federal enforcer 
would systematically underdeter due to the behavioral biases of 
agency personnel, we would need to consider how those biases 
might manifest themselves at the state level.  Introducing concurrent 
state enforcement would not add much value, after all, if the same 
cognitive limitations that affect federal enforcement officials cause 
 
127 See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 115, at 777. 
128 Cf. BERNARD NASH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, BEYOND 
DUE PROCESS—A LITIGATION PRIMER:  CHALLENGING ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHER 
GOVERNMENT CONTINGENCY FEE ARRANGEMENTS 1 (Jan. 2009), available at http:// 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research/continge
ncyfeemanual.pdf (“An increasing number of plaintiffs’ attorneys are soliciting state 
Attorneys General . . . and other government officials to permit them to bring cases on 
behalf of state and local governments on a contingency fee basis.”). 
129 Pritchard, supra note 95, at 1080. 
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state enforcers to underdeter systematically.  That said, it has been 
observed that “competition may have ameliorative effects on beha-
vioral biases among regulators.”130  Competition between federal and 
state enforcers to be viewed as the “best” regulator may therefore 
help mitigate behavioral biases that lead to underdeterrence. 
This discussion barely scratches the surface of the considerations 
that would inform a rigorous examination of the costs and benefits of 
state enforcement.  Such an examination would profit tremendously 
from empirical research into the nature and incidence of state securi-
ties fraud enforcement efforts—something that has gone largely unex-
plored in the academic literature.  While the efforts of former New York 
State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer and his successor, Andrew Cuomo, 
have been well publicized, we know comparably little about what, if any-
thing, the other forty-nine states have been doing to contribute to—or 
detract from—the goal of optimally deterring fraud in our national se-
curities markets.  These facts might provide insights on how better to 
leverage state enforcement in service of that goal. 
3.  Superior Alternatives? 
Even if it could be shown that an exclusive federal enforcer would 
systematically underdeter and that introducing concurrent state or pri-
vate enforcers would lead to a net savings in social costs, the case for a 
multienforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence would still be in-
complete.  As a functional matter, reforms designed to align the incen-
tives of the federal enforcer more closely with the national interest serve 
as potential substitutes for the adoption of a multienforcer approach to 
securities fraud deterrence.  As the following discussion makes clear, 
policymakers have numerous options in this regard.  If such reforms 
would produce greater net savings in social costs than the use of mult-
iple enforcers, they should clearly be preferred. 
In thinking through possible alternative reforms—just as in think-
ing through the likely costs and benefits of state enforcement—it is 
important to analyze exactly why we have presumed an exclusive fed-
eral enforcer would systematically underdeter. 
 
130 Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16 TRANS-
NAT’L LAW. 111, 118 (2002). 
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a.  Public Choice:  Congressional Dominance 
If, for example, we believe that systematic underdeterrence would 
occur because congressional oversight committees “captured” by in-
dustry would periodically starve an exclusive federal enforcer of funds, 
instead of responding by adding new enforcers into the mix, we could 
make the enforcement agency self-funding.  In the wake of the recent 
financial crisis, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher 
Dodd circulated draft legislation proposing this idea for the SEC, and 
the idea has the support of SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro131 and the 
Investors Working Group, a nonpartisan group chaired by former SEC 
Chairmen Arthur Levitt Jr. and William H. Donaldson.132 
Another way to deal with funding concerns would be to permit the 
federal enforcer to tap state and private resources without surrender-
ing control over enforcement policy.  For example, we might allow pri-
vate enforcement, but grant the federal enforcer authority to screen 
class action complaints prior to filing.133  Similarly, we might permit 
state enforcement, but authorize the federal enforcer to invalidate 
state orders that it believes conflict with the public interest.134  Because 
any decision to veto a class action complaint or override state en-
forcement efforts would be public, members of Congress would likely 
think twice before seeking to influence those decisions in a way that 
favors industry at the expense of optimal deterrence.  These proposals 
would likewise “deter[] public enforcers from making self-
serving . . . under-enforcement decisions by rendering their prosecu-
 
131Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, News Conference Call:  Statement Concern-
ing Agency Self-Funding (Apr. 15, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2010/spch041510mls.htm) (“[S]elf funding ensures independence, faci-
litates long-term planning, and closes the resource gap between the agency and the 
entities we regulate.  In the process, it allows the SEC to better protect millions of in-
vestors whose savings are at stake.”).    
132 INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:  THE IN-
VESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 9 (July 2009), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/ 
file/resource%20center/investment%20issues/Investors%27%20Working%20Group%
20Report%20(July%202009).pdf (“To the extent possible, agencies should have fund-
ing flexibility to respond to [market changes and financial innovation] on their own.”). 
133 See Rose, supra note 8, at 1354-58 (proposing that the SEC be granted such au-
thority).  For a creative alternative suggested in the antitrust context, see David Rosen-
berg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency Enforcement 
of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 159, 178 (2006), in which the authors 
argue for an “auction-buyback” mechanism that allows the public enforcer “to auction 
off a private license to prosecute the class action while retaining the option of buying it 
back at the price of the winning bid.” 
134 See John C. Coffee, Jr., & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC:  Does the Treasury 
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 779-81 (2009) (making this suggestion). 
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torial choices . . . politically transparent and therefore more readily 
subject to monitoring and discipline.”135 
A more difficult, but potentially more effective, way to limit the sway 
of interest groups over enforcement policy would be through reform of 
campaign finance laws,136 or through a transfer of control over the 
agency from the legislative to the executive branch.137  If we believe that 
the dominant interest groups really would prefer optimal securities 
fraud deterrence, but nevertheless would lobby for an underfunded 
federal enforcement agency because of other regulatory authority which 
that agency possesses,138 an obvious solution would be to make the en-
forcement division its own separate agency. 
b.  Public Choice:  Bureaucratic Slack 
If instead we anticipate systematic underdeterrence by an exclusive 
federal enforcer because of the “revolving door” between the en-
forcement agency and Wall Street, a different set of potential reforms 
would logically present itself.  For example, we might attempt to in-
crease the transparency of the agency’s enforcement decisions, so that 
instances of favoritism would be more readily discovered and pu-
nished.139  Or salaries at the enforcement agency might be made more 
competitive with those of the private sector, so that agency personnel 
would have greater incentives to make a career at the agency.  If our 
concern were not the “revolving door,” but rather the laziness of gov-
ernment lawyers, salaries at the enforcement agency might be made 
more merit based, so as to create incentives for tougher enforcement. 
c.  Behavioral Biases 
Finally, if we believe that behavioral biases would skew an exclusive 
federal enforcer toward systematic underdeterrence, we could imple-
 
135 Rosenberg & Sullivan, supra note 133, at 166. 
136 See, e.g., Yu & Yu, supra note 88, at 3-4 (suggesting that there be more transpa-
rency in corporate political spending).  
137 See Pritchard, supra note 95, at 1099-1101 (arguing for such a shift); Peter J. 
Henning, Should the SEC Spin Off the Enforcement Division? 11 (Wayne State Univ. Law 
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-20, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470857 (suggesting that transferring the SEC’s fraud en-
forcement authority to the Department of Justice would “lessen[] the ability of Wall 
Street to lobby for a weaker enforcement regime”). 
138 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
139 See Gadinis, supra note 88, at 65-66 (suggesting various methods that “would 
provide benchmarks that could facilitate public monitoring of SEC enforcement”). 
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ment a variety of solutions.  For example, “it may make sense for agen-
cies such as the SEC to conduct periodic audits of assumptions (in the 
form of roundtable discussions, whether open or closed to the public) 
as an antidote to excessive habitual behavior.”140  The SEC might, for 
example, consider the critique that its enforcement division is particu-
larly lax in boom times (when market-based mechanisms to combat 
fraud are at their weakest) and particularly aggressive in bust times 
(when market-based mechanisms to combat fraud are at their strong-
est) and adopt countercyclical enforcement policies to offset the biases 
that may be driving this phenomenon.  If agency personnel are biased 
because they are overwhelmingly “socialized” in the private sector, the 
agency might try hiring from a more diverse pool of candidates.141 
*      *      * 
The foregoing is far from a complete list of possible alternative 
ways to mitigate the risk of systematic underdeterrence that an ex-
clusive federal securities fraud enforcer may present.  But even this 
quick survey of possibilities reveals that many options, short of 
adopting a multienforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence, 
are available to policymakers.  These types of alternative reforms de-
serve more sustained attention than they have received to date. 
IV.  A NEW PATH FORWARD:  ENFORCER-FOCUSED REFORM 
The discussion thus far has raised many more questions than it 
has answered.  Based on existing evidence, we cannot say that the pre-
conditions for efficient use of a multienforcer approach to securities 
fraud deterrence exist in the United States.  Nor can we say that they 
do not.  What should policymakers do in the face of this uncertainty? 
One response would be to gather more facts.  For example, recent 
studies have attempted to elucidate how the SEC operates as a political 
institution,142 and further research along these lines might help us pre-
dict whether a monopolistic SEC would systematically underdeter and, 
 
140 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy:  Public Choice, Institutional Rhe-
toric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 539 (1990); see also 
Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 56, at 592 (noting that “[i]nstitutional designers 
can . . . attempt to build in requirements of data collection and analysis, as well as in-
centives for periodic policy reassessment” as a technique for mitigating biases). 
141 See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop?  The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 822 
(2009) (arguing that the SEC should “incorporate a sufficient range of viewpoints to 
allow the agency to operate independently of Wall Street financial firms, corporate is-
suers, and other influential market participants”). 
142 See supra note 88.  
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if so, why.  We must be cautious about the inferences we draw from this 
type of research, however:  the SEC enforcement division does not nec-
essarily behave today the way it would in a counterfactual world in 
which it were the exclusive enforcer.143  Additional research might also 
help us better estimate the value of private and state enforcement, but 
this type of research will likewise have its limits.  Isolating the impact of 
private and state enforcement on under- and overdeterrence costs is no 
easy task.  Nevertheless, there remains fruitful work to be done.  For ex-
ample, we would benefit from additional information regarding state 
enforcement efforts, as well as a better understanding of how managers 
respond to the threat of liability at the hands of different types of en-
forcers.  Still, one cannot help but feel that, though we can and should 
strengthen our intuitions regarding the efficiency of the current re-
gime, we will never be able to resolve the issue definitively. 
In the face of this sort of irreducible uncertainty, the status quo 
tends to persevere.  This result will not trouble those who suspect that 
private and state enforcers produce a significant net savings in social 
costs and that nothing would mitigate SEC underdeterrence as effi-
ciently as their unrestrained enforcement efforts.  But I doubt that 
many knowledgeable observers share this suspicion.  I, for one, do 
not.  My guess is that the more prevalent sentiment is distrust of the 
SEC’s ability to handle fraud deterrence on its own—at least as cur-
rently constituted—coupled with uncertainty regarding the benefits of 
private and state enforcement. 
In light of these observations, there is no reason to accept the cur-
rent allocation of enforcement authority in the United States as sacro-
sanct.  Rather, we should give thoughtful consideration to consolidat-
ing enforcement authority in a single federal regulator, such as the 
SEC, while at the same time adopting reforms to align the federal en-
forcer’s incentives more closely with the public interest (so as to offset 
any increased risk of underdeterrence this change might introduce).  
To be sure, we cannot know with certainty whether such reforms 
would result in a net savings in social costs.  But they at least offer the 
potential for capturing the enforcer-based efficiencies discussed in 
Part II, which is an important advantage.  Such reforms would also 
greatly simplify our securities fraud deterrence regime, making it easi-
er to evaluate—and ultimately improve—its functioning going for-
 
143 The SEC might perform better in such a world because it would be more ac-
countable for securities fraud enforcement policy than it is today.  On the other hand, 
it might be less disciplined if state and private enforcers were no longer around to ex-
pose its failings.  
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ward.  The sheer complexity of the regime as currently constituted is a 
major obstacle to studying its effectiveness. 
What types of reforms should accompany a move toward a unitary-
enforcer approach?  To answer that question would take us beyond the 
scope of this Article.  However, several possibilities were raised in sub-
section III.B.3.  For example, if a lack of funding is the primary reason 
we fear SEC underdeterrence, one option would be to make the agency 
self-funding.  Another would be to retain private or state enforcement 
while giving the SEC ultimate authority over which cases proceed.  Dif-
ferent reasons for doubting the SEC would give rise to different reform 
proposals.  My aim here is not to declare which reasons are most com-
pelling, but rather to suggest that these are issues that scholars and  
policymakers should be considering.  It is time to move beyond the de-
bate over where to draw the line on substance, sanctions, and proce-
dure, and to deliberate seriously about enforcer-focused reforms. 
CONCLUSION 
In a world without legal error or vicarious liability, designing an 
effective securities fraud deterrence regime would be relatively easy.  
Because overdeterrence would not be a risk, lawmakers would be well 
advised to keep substance broad, sanctions high, and procedure liber-
al, and to employ an army of aggressive enforcers.  Lawmakers’ only 
hard job would be ensuring that marginal direct enforcement costs 
did not come to exceed the marginal savings in underdeterrence 
costs.  But in a world like our own, with both legal error and vicarious 
liability, lawmakers must design a securities fraud deterrence regime 
in a way that accounts for the risk of overdeterrence. 
They can do so in two unequally attractive ways.  First, they can 
reduce the likelihood of overdeterrence by narrowing substance, lo-
wering sanctions, or toughening procedure.  These sorts of adjust-
ments, however, are costly because they involve inevitable tradeoffs in 
the form of increased underdeterrence costs.  They are also likely to 
provoke controversy because empirical uncertainty will cause some to 
believe that the adjustments do more harm than good.  Alternatively, 
lawmakers can focus on the incentives of the enforcer.  An enforcer 
whose incentives align well with society’s interest in achieving optimal 
deterrence could mitigate overdeterrence costs in three important 
ways.  First, by bringing more accurate prosecutions, such an enforcer 
could reduce the overall amount of legal error in the system without 
the same stark tradeoffs inherent in the previous approach.  Second, 
use of such an enforcer could increase the flexibility with which the 
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securities fraud deterrence regime adjusts to new information and 
changed circumstances.  Finally, such an enforcer could, through its 
use of prosecutorial discretion, mitigate the special overdeterrence 
risk that the use of vicarious liability presents. 
Despite the value that a well-incentivized enforcer can add to a se-
curities fraud deterrence regime, the scholarly literature critical of the 
U.S. system rarely considers enforcer-focused reforms.  Instead, the 
literature is usually directed at how we might tweak substance, sanc-
tions, and procedure to promote optimal deterrence more success-
fully.  This trend would be understandable if it were clear that the mix 
of enforcers the United States uses is as good as it gets.  But the opti-
mality of our multienforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence 
has gone largely unexplored. 
This Article takes a step toward filling that gap in the literature.  
Again, participants in the U.S. national securities markets face poten-
tial fraud liability not only at the hands of the SEC, but also at the 
hands of private parties enforcing Rule 10b-5, and state regulators en-
forcing state antifraud provisions.  This arrangement undermines the 
enforcer-based efficiencies mentioned above in significant ways and 
complicates the ability of any of these enforcers to coherently pursue 
policies that approximate optimal deterrence.  But it is not enough 
for those who favor preemption of state enforcement authority or the 
elimination of Rule 10b-5 class actions simply to point to these con-
cerns.  Nor is it enough for those who would defend state and private 
enforcement to rely on vague public-choice postulates and isolated 
cases of fraud that the SEC failed to deter (even big ones, like the Ma-
doff scheme) to prove their case.  To be persuasive, more sophisti-
cated arguments are required. 
The analysis in this Article suggests that the U.S. arrangement may 
serve the cause of optimal deterrence if, but only if, one takes a skep-
tical view of lawmakers or bureaucrats.  Specifically, one must assume 
that the SEC would systematically underdeter, either on its own initia-
tive or under congressional influence, if given exclusive reign.  Fur-
ther, one must assume that private and state enforcers, respectively, 
save more in underdeterrence costs than they create in additional en-
forcement costs.  Finally, no other reforms must be available that 
would deal more efficiently with the risk of systematic SEC under-
deterrence, should it exist, than the current regime does.  These as-
sumptions are not self-evidently correct—far from it— and future re-
search, attention, and debate should focus on their validity. 
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But where does this leave us today?  To be sure, the tendency in 
the face of this sort of uncertainty is to privilege the status quo.  But 
the status quo approach to securities fraud deterrence in the United 
States is mostly the product of historical accident and has few disinte-
rested defenders.  I would therefore urge Congress at least to consider 
unifying enforcement authority under the aegis of a single federal 
regulator, while simultaneously implementing reforms designed to 
mitigate any risk of underdeterrence this change would introduce or 
exacerbate.  A variety of such reforms are possible, including options 
that would preserve some (albeit subordinated) role for private and 
state enforcers.  Which reforms are most desirable will depend upon 
what we perceive as driving the risk of underdeterrence.  I cannot 
claim to know whether such a move would lead to a net savings in so-
cial costs, but it would, at least, introduce the possibility of capturing 
the enforcer-based efficiency gains described above.  It would also re-
duce the amount of indeterminacy that exists today.  It is hard enough 
to judge the performance of a securities fraud deterrence regime en-
forced by a single prosecutor; when multiple prosecutors—pursuing 
potentially conflicting enforcement priorities—are added to the mix, 
the task becomes immensely more complex. 
 
